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Summary  
 
Protection of refugees is a primary responsibility of the host state. However, if a state is unable 
or unwilling, to exercise its protection obligations, these shifts to international organizations, 
mainly UNHCR and its implementing partners. Considering UNHCR’s specific mandate to 
provide ‘international protection’ to refugees and to seek ‘permanent solutions for the problem of 
refugees’ my research thesis will try to discuss the following questions: 
 When a violation occurs in refugee camps to which actors shall responsibility be 
allocated?  
 What circumstances may UNHCR be held internationally responsible for human rights 
violations taking place in refugee camps?  
To resolve the above research questions, my paper will also answer the following three different 
but related questions: first, what is the normative status of refugee rights under Ethiopian legal 
system and the human rights obligation of the state in relation to refugee protection? Second, 
why do we still have refugee camps? Third, and more central: is that possible for a number of 
actors to be simultaneously responsible under both ILC’s (ARISWA) and (ARIO)?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: refugee camps, human rights violations, Ethiopian asylum system, UNHCR, responsibility 
to protect 
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Chapter one 
Introduction 
 1.1 Back Ground 
The host state has the primary responsibility for the protection of everyone, including refugees, 
present on its territory. From this follows the reasonable assumption that it is the authorities and 
laws of that state that also govern the refugee camps within its borders. Nevertheless, as we are 
going to see in this thesis, the extent to which the host state exercises authority and control in 
these camps varies widely. The refugee camp is as such an anomalous establishment being 
situated on the territory of a host state but in practice often controlled by a wide range of actors 
other than host state authorities. In place of the host state, UNHCR and its implementing NGOs 
have progressively assumed responsibility for the management and control of these camps.  
Several legal norms furthermore govern which actors have an obligation to protect the 
fundamental human rights of refugees. The multiplicity of actors and, consequently, legal 
regimes - all converging within the space of the refugee camp arguably contributes to a state of 
legal ambiguity rather than to a strong and comprehensive regime in which refugees are 
protected at different levels. These are particularly the main issues we are going to discuss in this 
paper.  
Refugee camps are intended to hold people for a short amount of time until they can return back 
to everyday life either in their home country, in the country of first asylum or being resettled in a 
third State. However, many people are unable to return home and end up staying in camps for 
years while suffering from lack of work, lack of freedom of movement, and at some level fear of 
physical abuse. 
In Ethiopia refugee camps can in practice generally be said to be administered on three 
distinctive, but highly intricate, levels: the government of Ethiopia (as represented by the 
Administration of Refugees Returnees Affairs aka ARRA), the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UNHCR implementing partners, which are often 
non-governmental organizations. These three levels often come about through various forms of 
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delegation. The Ethiopian Government for example to various extents, and with or without a 
formal agreement, delegate refugee-related tasks to the UNHCR. In turn, UNHCR may through a 
sub-contracting/tripartite agreement delegate refugee camp projects to non-governmental 
organizations, such as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) or the Jesuit Refugee Service (]RS).  
This delegation of work in refugee camps creates questions when it comes to issues of 
responsibility. Several different actors may have varying degrees of responsibility for the 
protection of the human rights of refugees. And the degree of responsibility attributed to each 
actor would primarily be dependent upon the ability and willingness of the host state, which is 
Ethiopia in our case to provide effective protection.  
Therefore, basically the center of this paper is that of the unable or unwilling state, which is 
evidently true for Ethiopian refugee camps.  
1.2 Aim of the Study 
The primary aim of my paper is to contribute to the discussion of how to protect the human 
rights of refugees in refugee camps. While there is no doubt that the sovereign host state holds 
the primary responsibility for the human rights situation within its jurisdiction, it is also relevant 
to discuss issues of responsibility in relation to UNHCR and other actors inside refugee camps. 
Obviously, it is UNHCR’s international law mandate to provide international protection to 
refugees and seek solutions for refugee problems.1 Thus, we will be asking in detail on the 
following chapters of this paper, whether or not UNHCR has a duty to take action in response to 
human rights violations in refugee camps. If so, what are the possible limitations that exist for 
the scope of its responsibility? And also, is UNHCR responsible for acts and omissions of its 
implementing partners in refugee camps operations? This paper explores issues related to human 
rights of refugee in refugee camps and to some extent the rules of international responsibility, as 
well as in view of a case study of refugee camps in Ethiopia. 
  
 
                                                          
1 See the Statue of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee [UNHCR Statue], adopted by the UN 
general assembly in Res. 428. See UN Doc. No. A/RES/428 (14 Dec. 1950), para 1. 
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1.3 Method and Material  
In order to find answers to the above mentioned research questions, a number of research 
methods employed. The traditional legal methodology, encapsulating literature from recognized 
scholars, is mainly used. The international, regional and domestic refugee law instruments and 
Human Right Conventions are also examined in addition to the literatures. Since United Nation 
High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) is at the core of this research paper, materials 
produced by the office are also used extensively. UNHCR ExCom decisions, different 
Handbooks, and further official reports are analyzed. The thesis chose the case study of human 
rights violations in Ethiopian refugee camps, in order to show the challenges of international 
protection from a practical perspective and to present the general over view of refugee camp 
situations. The legal analysis of domestic laws: most importantly, critical analysis of the 
Ethiopian Refugee Legislation, applicable human right laws and information obtained through 
discussions with ARRA and UNHCR staff members have been consulted and employed in 
addition to the writer’s personal observation while working for UNHCR Ethiopia office reflected 
in this thesis.  
1.4 Scope and Delimitations 
Trying to present, examine, assess and compare then conclude a large subject such as the human 
rights violations in refugee camps of Ethiopia and determine which actor has the responsibility 
for such violations is indeed a hard work. It is hard because it has different dimensions at the 
national and international levels, and because it comprises a large composition of different areas 
such as legal, political and economic fields. No doubt that each area has its own significance in 
forming the whole picture. Nevertheless, the examination of all these areas with the limited 
scope of this thesis may give a broad study without depth in the subject matter. To equalize the 
depth with the breadth this study will seek to answer the following questions:  
When a violation occurs in refugee camps to which actors shall responsibility be allocated?  
What circumstances may UNHCR be held internationally responsible for human rights violations 
taking place in refugee camps?  
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What is the normative status of refugee rights under Ethiopian legal system and the human rights 
obligation of the state in relation to refugee protection? 
Is that possible for a number of actors to be simultaneously responsible under both ILC’s 
(ARISWA) and (ARIO)? 
Moreover, it is important to note that the government in Ethiopia, especially the responsible 
refugee agency (ARRA) officials wasn’t just un-supportive of the writer’s intention to conduct 
research on the matters of refugee rights but, they genuinely brought danger to his safety. It was 
almost impossible to access any official information from ARRA office and most of the 
information provided in this paper gathered in a very informal way, mainly by asking his former 
colleagues at UNHCR Ethiopia.  
1.5 Disposition 
To begin with, chapter 2 will explain the legal basis of the principle of states responsibility in 
international law and the rights of refugees. In particular, this chapter will look at the interplay 
between international refugee law and international human rights law and/or international 
humanitarian law. Regarding states responsibility we will look at deep into each regimes of 
International refugee law, international human rights and international humanitarian law to 
analyze and discuss the provision that linked with states responsibility. In chapter 3, the 
presentation will describe the nature of refugee camps in general. Firstly, the definition of the 
term refugee camp will be addressed and, secondly, the protracted refugee situations will be 
explained. Here the text goes directly to discuss the problems that are attached to the long term 
refugee encampment policies. Thirdly, relevant policies of UNHCR related to refugee camps will 
be considered. Especially, we will have a sneak peak on the brand new UNHCR alternative to 
refugee camps policy document.  
Chapter 4 describes the applicable Ethiopian legal system with regard to the refugee populations. 
This description comprehends the constitutional provisions, the 2004 refugee proclamation and 
some notes about the Administration for Refugee and Returnees Affairs (ARRA), a responsible 
government agency in a matter of refugees all over Ethiopia. The thesis is thereafter tied together 
in chapter 5 and the main questions of presented in this introductory chapter are answered and 
discussed. Firstly, I will analyze if there are any inconsistencies between the international law 
5 
 
regimes governing the attribution of responsibility to host states at the time of human rights 
violations in refugee camps. Secondly, I will summarize the reasons why UNHCR has a major 
share in refugee protection or in administration of refugee camps and as a result holding 
responsibility at the situation of any refugee rights violations. This chapter will lastly include a 
discussion on the possibility of responsibility sharing between UNHCR and its implementing 
partners in refugee camps. Finally, chapter 6 will conclude the thesis and at this point, I will 
present my final comments. 
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Chapter Two 
Refugee Rights and States Responsibility 
 
2.1 General Overview 
 
“Human rights violations are a major factor in causing the flight of refugees as well as an 
obstacle to their safety and voluntary return home. Safeguarding human rights in countries of 
origin is therefore critical both for the prevention and for the solution of refugee problems.  
Respect for human rights is also essential for the protection of refugees in countries of asylum”.2  
-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
 
All refugees have the same human rights afforded to any other person. In addition, there are 
specific human rights applicable due to the circumstances refugees face. Human rights 
particularly relevant to refugees include:  
 the right to life, liberty and security of person;  
 the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;  
 the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state;  
 the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;  
 the right to freedom of opinion and expression;  
 the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of the person and their 
family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services;  
 the right to education  
 freedom from discrimination; and  
 respect for the unity of the family. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Statement made at the 50th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (1994) Quoted in UNHCR, Human 
Rights and Refugee Protection, Part I: General Introduction (October, 1995), p.4. 
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2.2 Refugee Rights as Human Rights 
Are refugee rights human rights? Such a question may appear provocative at a time when 
refugees are regularly victims of abuses in a context of restrictive refugee policies. While this sad 
reality is anything but new, it is further exacerbated by the current crisis. The Ex-United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) chief, António Guterres, observes that ‘the human 
right agenda out of which UNHCR was born, and on which we depend, is increasingly coming 
under strain. The global …crisis brought with it a populist wave of anti-foreigner sentiment, 
albeit often couched in terms of national sovereignty and national security’.3 
Against such a background, assessing the relations between refugee law, humanitarian law and 
human rights law is essential in order to identify the full range of states’ obligations and thereby 
inform their practice towards refugees and asylum seekers. Although refugee law and human 
rights law were initially conceived as two distinct branches of international law, their 
multifaceted interaction is now well acknowledged in both state practice and academic writing.4 
Refugee law, international humanitarian law, and human rights law are complementary bodies of 
law that share a common goal, the protection of the lives, health and dignity of persons. They 
form a complex network of complementary protections and it is essential that we understand how 
they interact.  
 
2.2.1 Refugee Law vs. Human Rights Law 
First, let’s see the interplay between Refugee law and Human Rights law. In seeking to ensure 
humane treatment for a particularly vulnerable group of people, international refugee law is 
closely related to international human rights law, which focuses on preserving the dignity and 
well-being of every individual. Originally, the relationship between the two has been approached 
as a causal link, the violations of human rights being acknowledged as the primary cause of 
                                                          
3 A. Guterres, Remarks at the Opening of the Judicial Year of the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 28 
January 2011, 2. 
4 Vincent Chetail, Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations between 
Refugee Law and Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press Scholarship Online, available at: 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701170.001.0001/acprof-9780198701170-
chapter-2?print=pdf  
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refugee movements.5 The two bodies of law are complementary; increasingly, human rights 
principles have been applied to enhance refugee protection: 
  In terms of the entitlements that refugees and asylum-seekers have under international 
human rights law in the country of asylum; 
  In so far as international mechanisms to monitor the proper implementation of human 
rights law can be utilized by, and on behalf of, individual refugee men, women and 
children; 
  In how international human rights law influences UNHCR policy, for instance, in setting 
standards of due process, conditions of detention, gender equality, and children’s rights. 
 
The entire international protection framework is based on human rights concepts. It aims to help 
those who have been forced to flee their countries because their rights have been violated. In 
particular, the notion of persecution, which is at the heart of the refugee definition in the 1951 
Convention/1967 Protocol, is regularly interpreted in accordance with human rights standards.6 
An understanding of international human rights law is therefore vital for securing international 
protection for refugees and others of concern. 
 
Since human rights law applies to everyone, including refugees, regardless of their legal status, it 
is a helpful standard to use in assessing the quality of the treatment that asylum countries offer to 
refugees and asylum-seekers on their territories. This is particularly important when States are 
not Parties to any of the refugee treaties (the 1951 Convention, its 1967 Protocol, or the OAU 
refugee Convention). 
 
The prohibition under customary and treaty-based human rights law on returning a person to a 
territory where he/she is at risk of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
                                                          
5 See, in particular, P. Weis, ‘Refugees and Human Rights’, 1 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1971) 35, esp. at 
48–9; M. Moussalli, ‘Human Rights and Refugees’, Yearbook of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
(1984) 13; G. J. L. Coles, ‘Human Rights and Refugee Law’, Bulletin of Human Rights (1991/1) 63; T. Stoltenberg, 
‘Human Rights and Refugees’, in A. Eide and J. Helgesen (eds), The Future of Human Rights Protection in a 
Changing World: Essays in Honour of Torkel Opsahl (1991) 145. 
6 James Hathaway, “Fear of Persecution and the Law of Human Rights”, Bulletin of Human Rights, 91/1, United 
Nations, (New York, 1992), p.99. 
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punishment, reinforces the principle of non-refoulement under refugee law.7 In doing so, it offers 
another legal avenue for securing protection for individual refugees, through recourse to an 
international complaints mechanism that is not available under the provisions of the 
1951Convention/1967 Protocol.8 The Human Rights Committee and the Committee against 
Torture have both, for example, prevented the expulsion of individuals facing a substantial risk 
of torture.9 
 
Similarly, at the regional level, European Court of Human Rights can direct a country under its 
jurisdiction not to expel an asylum seeker to another country where he/she might be at risk of 
torture or any other violation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950).10 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has similar 
powers in relation to the prohibition on torture under the American Convention on Human 
Rights. 
 
The promotion of human rights is also relevant in securing solutions to refugee crises. Efforts to 
improve the human rights situation in a refugee-producing country are imperative if there is to be 
any real prospect of sustainable voluntary return and reintegration. 
 
Thus, the principles of human rights are applicable to all phases of the cycle of displacement 
which includes: the causes of displacement, determining eligibility for international protection, 
ensuring adequate standards of treatment in the country of asylum, ensuring that solutions are 
durable. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Chan, P., The protection of refugees and internally displaced persons: nonrefoulement under customary 
international  law?, The International Journal of Human Rights, 2006, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 231-239. 
8 Ibid 
9 See “Factum of the Intervenor, UNHCR, Suresh v. the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration; the Attorney 
General of Canada, SCC No. 27790” (hereafter: “UNHCR, Suresh Factum”), in 19:1 International Journal of 
Refugee Law (2002), pp. 141–157; 
10 For further on this topic, see the European Court of Human Rights website: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Statistics/Statistical+inf ormation+by+year/; the 
Human Rights website of the Swedish Government, 
http://www.manskligarattigheter.se/extra/faq/?module_instance=3&action=category_show 
&id=33&limit_category_ids=4, as accessed on 2011-05-01 
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2.2.2 Refugee Law vs. Humanitarian Law 
International humanitarian law is of relevance to refugee law and refugee protection in a number 
of ways. First, it helps to determine who is a refugee. Many asylum seekers are persons fleeing 
armed conflict and often violations of international humanitarian law. A person fleeing an armed 
conflict might not automatically falls within the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
which lays down a limited list of grounds for persecution. Recognizing that the majority of 
persons forced to leave their state of nationality today are fleeing the indiscriminate effect of 
hostilities and the accompanying disorder, including the destruction of homes, food stocks and 
means of subsistence – all violations of international humanitarian law – but with no specific 
element of persecution, subsequent regional refugee instruments, such as the 1969 OAU Refugee 
Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees have expanded their definitions to 
include persons fleeing armed conflict.11 Even states that are not party to these regional 
instruments have developed a variety of legislative and administrative measures, such as the 
notion of “temporary protection” for example, to extend protection to persons fleeing armed 
conflict. 
 
A second point of interface between international humanitarian law and refugee law is in relation 
to issues of exclusion. Violations of certain provisions of international humanitarian law are war 
crimes and their commission may exclude a particular individual from entitlement to protection 
as a refuge.12 
 
As far as protection is concerned international humanitarian law offers refugees who find 
themselves in a state experiencing armed conflict a two–tiered protection. First, provided that 
they are not taking a direct part in hostilities, as civilians refugees are entitled to protection from 
the effects of hostilities. Secondly, in addition to this general protection, international 
                                                          
11 EDUARDO ARBOLEDA, Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons of Pragmatism, Int J 
Refugee Law (1991) 3 (2): 185-207 doi:10.1093/ijrl/3.2.185; See also UNHCR EXPERT ROUNDTABLE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FOR PERSONS FLEEING ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER 
SITUATIONS OF VIOLENCE Cape Town, South Africa, 13 & 14 September 2012 
12 See statement at the International Association of Refugee Law Judges world conference, Stockholm, 21-23 April 
2005, by Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ICRC Legal Adviser.’International humanitarian law, refugee law and human 
rights law are complementary bodies of law that share a common goal, the protection of the lives, health and dignity 
of persons. They form a complex network of complementary protections and it is essential that we understand how 
they interact.’   
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humanitarian law grants refugees additional rights and protections in view of their situation as 
aliens in the territory of a party to a conflict and their consequent specific vulnerabilities.13 
 
If respected, international humanitarian law operates so as to prevent displacement of civilians 
and to ensure their protection during displacement, should they nevertheless have moved. Parties 
to a conflict are expressly prohibited from displacing civilians. This is a manifestation of the 
principle that the civilian population must be spared as much as possible from the effects of 
hostilities. 
 
During occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits individual or mass forcible 
transfers, both within the occupied territory and beyond its borders, either into the territory of the 
occupying power  or as is more the case in practice, in to third states.14 The 1949 Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War: article 44 of this 
Convention, whose aim is the protection of civilian victims, deals with refugees and displaced 
persons. Article 73 of the 1977 Additional Protocol stipulates that refugees and stateless persons 
shall be protected persons under parts I and III of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
In addition to this general protection, international humanitarian law affords refugees further 
specific protection. In international armed conflicts refugees are covered by the rules applicable 
to aliens in the territory of a party to a conflict generally as well as by the safeguards relating 
specifically to refugees.15 
 
Refugees benefit from the protections afforded by the Fourth Geneva Convention to aliens in the 
territory of a party to a conflict, including: 
 the entitlement to leave the territory in which they find themselves unless their departure 
would be contarary to the national interests of the state of asylum, 
  the continued entitlement to basic protections and rights to which aliens had been 
entitled before the outbreak of hostilities. 
                                                          
13 Ibid 
14 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. 
Available at: https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/380  
15 Supra note 11. 
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 guarantees with regards to mean of existence, if the measures of control applied to the 
aliens by the party to the conflict means that they are unable to support themselves. 
 
While recognizing that the party to the conflict in whose control the aliens find themselves may, 
if its security makes this absolutely necessary, intern the aliens or place them in assigned 
residence, the Convention provides that these are the strictest measures of control to which aliens 
may be subjected. Finally, the Fourth Convention also lays down limitations on the power of a 
belligerent to transfer aliens.16 Of particular relevance is the rule providing that a protected 
person may in no circumstances be transferred to a country where he or she may have reason to 
fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs; a very early expression of 
the principle of non-refoulement. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned rules for the benefit of all aliens in the territory of a party to a 
conflict, the Fourth Geneva Convention contains two further provisions expressly for the benefit 
of refugees. The first provides that refugees should not be treated as enemy aliens – and thus 
susceptible to the measures of control - solely on the basis of their nationality. This recognizes 
the fact refugees no longer have a link of allegiance with that state and are thus not automatically 
a potential threat to their host state. 
 
The second specific provision deals with the precarious position in which refugees may find 
themselves if the state which they have fled occupies their state of asylum. In such 
circumstances, the refugees may only be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from the 
occupied territory by the occupying power for offences committed after the outbreak of 
hostilities, or for offences unrelated to the conflict committed before the outbreak of hostilities 
which, according to the law of the now occupied state of asylum, would have justified 
extradition in time of peace. The objective of this provision is to ensure that refugees are not 
punished for acts - such as political offences - which may have been the cause of their departure 
from their state of nationality, or for the mere fact of having sought asylum. 
 
                                                          
16 Supra note 13. 
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And again, The Geneva Convention I-IV is only applicable in international armed conflicts, 
except common Article 3 which also applies in non-international armed conflicts. In order to 
determine which treaty law applies to a particular conflict, a prior characterization of the conflict 
as international or non-international is required and this is often difficult or subject to dispute. 
The study shows, however, that many rules apply equally in international and non-international 
armed conflicts. For example, the prohibition of attacks on civilians, journalists or humanitarian 
relief personnel and the prohibition of forced displacement of populations apply in any armed 
conflict. However, in a non-international armed conflict, each party is bound to apply, as a 
minimum, the fundamental humanitarian provisions of international law contained in Article 3 
common to all four Geneva Conventions. Those provisions are developed in and supplemented 
by Geneva Protocol II of 1977. Both common Article 3 and Geneva Protocol II apply with equal 
force to all parties to an armed conflict, government and rebels alike.  
 In addition, government troops and rebel forces must apply a number of other specific 
treaty rules relating to internal conflicts, namely:  
 Article 19 of the 1954 Cultural Property Convention and its Second Protocol of 1999 (the 
latter protocol has not yet entered into force at the time of writing);  
 Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention, on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996;  
 the Ottawa landmines treaty of 1997.  
The rules of customary international law certainly apply as well, in particular the basic principles 
of distinction,17 proportionality,18access to humanitarian relief,19 treatment of civilians,20 
displacements and displaced persons21  and good faith and humane treatment. 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 The Study on customary international humanitarian law conducted by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and originally published by Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1: principle of distinction, Rule 1. 
18 Ibid, Rule 14. 
19 Ibid, Rule 55 
20 Ibid, Rule 87 
21 Ibid, Rule 129 
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2.3 Refugee Rights Violations and State Responsibility 
2.3.1 International Human Rights Law as a Tool for State Responsibility  
The movement to internationalize the protection of human rights has led to the adoption of 
specific legal conventions pertaining to human rights and which also layout the basis for state 
responsibility. Instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), elaborated after 
World War II, specifically bring about restraints for state actions as well as a state responsibility 
to enforce human rights standards.22 Such frameworks consistently impose obligations on “state 
parties,” “contracting parties,” or “high contracting parties.”  
One of the clearest provisions in this regard is Article 2 of the ICCPR, which deals with the 
implementation of the rights agreed upon by states parties to the Covenant. It stipulates that:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.23  
Furthermore:  
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures 
as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.24 
In relation to this Article, the UN Human Rights Committee has expressed the view that while 
Article 2 of the Covenant generally leaves it to the states parties concerned to choose their 
method of implementation in their territories within the framework set out in that Article, the 
obligation under the Covenant is not confined to the respect of human rights, but that states 
parties have also undertaken to "ensure the enjoyment of these rights to all individuals under 
                                                          
22 As recognized by the ICTY in the Tadic case, it is clear that international law is gradually emerging from a state-
centric stance towards a moral, human rights approach. See Prosecutor v. Tadic [Tadic case], Case no. IT-94-l-I, 
ICTY, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, para. 97 (2 Oct. 1995). See also 1. 
Hammer, A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: DESCRIPTIVE THOUGHTS FOR  
NORMATIVE ISSUES (2007), at 115. 
23 ICCPR, Article 2(2). 
24 Ibid 
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their jurisdiction.”25 This duty to ensure has both negative and positive elements, it "is not to be 
understood as a negative right directed solely at the state, but rather that calls for positive 
measures to ensure it.”26 It is generally interpreted that the state fulfills its obligation to "respect" 
by not actively infringing the individual's rights, while the term "ensuring" indicates an 
affirmative obligation on the state to assure such rights.27 Extensive case law on state obligations 
to take positive action has in particular been developed within the auspices of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).28 Importantly, the idea of positive and negative obligations is 
linked to the duty of states to exercise due diligence to prevent, protect, fulfill and promote 
human rights.29 
Although due diligence obligations, unlike the rules of state responsibility, generally stem from 
treaty obligations, state obligations under human rights law and the laws of state responsibility 
seem to increasingly converge.30 It is arguable that the standards of due diligence and state 
responsibility could work in tandem, by informing each other and forming parts of a single 
whole. They are complementary and mutually reinforcing. As such, the state's obligation to 
protect the human rights of all individuals within its jurisdiction and under its authority is very 
broad.  
Many human rights conventions include special treaty mechanisms that have created procedures 
for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the obligations under the convention. Such 
                                                          
25 UNHRC, General Comment 3 on ICCPR, Article 2 (1981), paras. 1-2. See Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. no. HRI/GEN/lIRev.1 (1994), at 4. 
26 M. Nowak, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY (ZOOS), at 105 
27 See UNHRC, General Comment 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (2004). 
28 See in particular Marckx v. Belgium, 31 ECtHR (ser. A) (1979), Judgment (13 June) (Application N. 6833/74), 
para. 31; Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom, 44 ECtHR (ser. A) (1981) (Application N. 7601176; 
7806/77), Judgment, para. 49. See also the L.CB. v. United Kingdom judgment of the ECtHR, 9 June 1998, para. 36; 
Osman v. United Kingdom, 28 Oct 1998, para. ll5; A. v. United Kingdom, 23 Sept. 1998; ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 
Makaratzis v. Greece, Reports 2004-XI, paras. 56ff.  
29 Courts vary in their usage of the two concepts; the ECtHR, for example, exclusively refers to positive and 
negative obligations, whereas the Inter-American Court promulgates the term due diligence. See B. Hofstetter, 
European Court of Human Rights: Positive Obligations in E. and others v. United Kingdom, 2 I]CL 3 (2004), 525-
560 at 531. See also E. Brems, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY (2001), at 446.  
30 Certain scholars have nevertheless argued that they do not correctly reflect the contemporary international legal 
arena. For a critique of the application of the ILC Articles to matters regarding human rights violations, see C. 
Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, 10 EJIL 2 (1999), 387-395 at 395; A. Clapham, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993), at 188; A. Clapham, The 'Drittwirkunq' of the Convention, in R.St.J. 
Macdonald et al. (eds.), THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1993), at 
170.  
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procedures include individual complaint procedures, periodic reporting, and political and judicial 
inter-state proceedings. Simma and Pulkowski have, for example, argued that, since, individual 
claims procedures and reporting procedures are not concerned with the same substantive matter 
as the ARSIWA, such mechanisms generally do not constitute leges speciales to the ARSIWA.31 
The function of reporting mechanisms is to provide a comprehensive monitoring and human 
rights critique of a particular member state, while the ARSIWA are concerned with the legal 
consequences of concrete breaches. Such procedures would complement the right to invoke state 
responsibility rather than replace it.  
It should finally be noted that, with few exceptions, human rights guarantees are not absolute but 
are rather subject to specific limitations. The extent of these limitations cannot be determined in 
general terms, but has to be ascertained for each individual right. Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, for 
example, stipulates:  
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating 
from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.32  
Nevertheless, no derogations are permitted from certain absolute human rights guarantees. 
Examples of absolute obligations relevant to this study include the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman treatment or punishment and the prohibition of slavery.33  
Moreover, there are rights which in principle are non-derogable but where special cases entail 
that an interference with the right concerned does not constitute a violation.34 Within human 
rights treaties, then, the main criterion used to assess whether a defense of necessity can be 
successfully invoked is proportionality. This principle holds that the extent of the restriction of 
                                                          
31 B. Simma & D. Pulkowski, Leges Speciales and Self-Contained Regimes, in J. Crawford et al. (eds.), THE LAw 
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2010). at 139-140.  
32See also ECHR, Article 15; ACHR, Article 27.  
33 See for instance Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case no. IT-95-17/1-T1O, ICTY (TC), Judgment (10 Dec. 1998). 
34 See for instance ICCPR, Article 8(3)(a) which prohibits forced and compulsory labor but also includes exceptions 
to this general prohibition. 
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the human right concerned should be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.35 As such, the 
restriction will only be considered necessary when the proportionality requirement is satisfied. 
2.3.2 International Refugee Law as a Tool for State Responsibility  
There are a number of provisions in the 1951 Refugee Convention that pose duties upon states 
parties. Most importantly, states have a duty to provide protection to refugees. This includes 
states obligation to respect the principle of non-refoulement, embedded in Article 33 which 
stipulates that no refugee shall be returned to any country "where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion." Importantly, neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor regional refugee 
instruments such as the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention generally allow states to derogate from 
their obligations.36 Although, unlike the UN Torture Convention that contains an absolute 
prohibition of refoulement, the 1951 Refugee Convention contains a provision in which states 
may lawfully restrict refugee rights under one or two narrow circumstances. Firstly, a small 
number of Convention rights may be withdrawn for reasons of security or criminality. Secondly, 
the rights of persons whose refugee status has yet to be confirmed may be temporarily suspended 
on national security grounds during a war of other grave emergency.  
Although the ILC has labeled international refugee law as "exotic and highly specialized,"37 this 
field of law lays only a limited basis for state responsibility. Within the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, one could envisage two different ways of holding states responsible for violations of 
the Convention; either through Article 35 concerning UNHCR'S supervisory function or through 
the Convention's compromissory clause as laid down in Article 38.  
Article 35 of the Refugee Convention, titled "Co-operation of the National Authorities with the 
United Nations, obliges states parties in Article 35(1) to "undertake to co-operate with [UNHCR] 
in the exercise of its functions, and ... in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the 
                                                          
35 C. Ryngaert, State Responsibility, Necessity and Human Rights, 41 NYlL (2010), 79-98 at 88. 
36 This possibility is expressly stated in the relevant articles of the Convention; see for instance Articles 28, 32-33. 
Secondly, the rights of persons whose refugee status has not yet been confirmed may be provisionally suspended on 
national security grounds during war or other grave emergency. See further J. Hathaway, THE RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005), at 260ff. 
37 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 Apr. 
2006), para. 8. 
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application of the provisions of [the] Convention." Article 35(2) goes on to state that states 
parties must "undertake to provide [UNHCR] ... with information and statistical data concerning: 
(a) the conditions of refugees, (b) the implementation of this Convention, and (c) laws, 
regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees.38 As we can 
see, the primary purpose of the provisions appear to be to link the duty of states parties to apply 
the Convention and the 1967 Protocol with UNHCR'S task of supervising their application; a 
treaty obligation  is imposed on states parties to on the one hand respect UNHCR'S supervisory 
power and not hinder the organization in carrying out this task, and, on the other hand, to 
actively cooperate with UNHCR in this regard in order to achieve an optimal implementation of 
all provisions of the Convention and its Protocol. Can such supervision by UNHCR function as a 
tool for state responsibility?  
The true meaning of UNHCR'S supervisory duties has never been truly explored, and the 
drafting history shows that the drafters did not have a clear understanding of what supervision on 
the part of UNHCR would signify and entail. As one commentator explained, "the drafting 
process raised questions rather than [answer] them."39 However, in the literature, "supervision" 
has generally been understood as the equivalent of monitoring rule compliance. It appears to 
presuppose a clear understanding of the meaning of the various provisions of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, but, more importantly, supervision also appears to 
presuppose knowledge about actual application on the part of states parties.40 There is 
nevertheless no periodic, regular reporting requirement for states as such; there is only an 
obligation to "undertake to provide" with information "in the appropriate form.”41 The 
supervisory powers of UNHCR are also not accompanied by the power to enforce compliance in 
states parties in case of contraventions or violations of the Convention and Protocol. UNHCR's 
power is limited to making formal and informal representations to governments. And even then, 
there has been increased criticism of UNHCR by outside observers, who point out that UNHCR 
cannot exercise the requisite of independence, and cannot take a strong stance towards states 
                                                          
38 UNHCR'S supervisory responsibility is also mentioned in Article 1 and 8(a) and (d) of the UNHCR Statute, as 
well as Article II(l) of the 1967 Protocol. 
39 M. Zieck, Article 35 1951 Convention/Article II 1967 Protocol, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), THE 1951 
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL: A 
COMMENTARY (2011), 1459-15ll at 1494, para. 64. 
40 Ibid at 1495, para. 65. 
41 Article 35(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
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which violate the rights of refugees. UNHCR has been fundamentally transformed from an 
agency whose task was to be a guardian of refugee rights as implemented by states, to an agency 
which itself is involved in rights implementation - UNHCR is often the means by which refugee 
rights are delivered on the ground. Article 35 is as such limited to at best being a means of "soft 
enforcement"42 rather being a robust tool for state responsibility.  
Article 38 of the 1951 Refugee Convention nevertheless provides a different opportunity for 
holding states responsible for refugee rights violations. It is a so-called "compromissory clause" 
attributing compulsory jurisdiction to the international Court of Justice under Article 36 of the 
ICJ Statute with regard to disputes arising under and with respect to the Convention. The subject 
matter of the dispute brought before the Court must be related to the "interpretation or 
application" of the Convention, and similar dispute settlement provisions can be found in 
numerous treaties. Under the decentralized implementation structure envisaged by the 1951 
Refugee Convention, it is governments themselves which ultimately remain responsible to 
ensure that refugees are treated as the Convention requires. Any state party may legitimately take 
up concerns regarding non-compliance directly with any other state party, and may in most cases 
require the non-compliant state to answer to the International Court of Justice.43 
The main problem with the compromissory clause in the Convention is that states which are not 
directly affected by non-compliance have little incentive to become active. In general it is not 
states but individuals who are victims of a violation of the Refugee Convention, and this without 
being accorded individual judicial protection. Protection before the ICJ could be exercised by 
way diplomatic protection, but the individual concerned will generally not be a national of the 
state of residence and his home state will not be interested in protection. Furthermore, inter-state 
complaints come at a high political cost; while there have been some formal protests by states 
parties about the conduct of other states parties, no application has ever been made to the 
international Court of Justice as contemplated by Article 38. Thus, in practice, Article 35 and 38 
are clearly limited and offer little opportunity for holding states responsible for violations of 
international refugee law. 
                                                          
42 V. Turk, UNHCR'S Supervisory Responsibility, 14 RQDI (2001),135-159 at 135,149.  
43 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. 
Yugo.) [Genocide case], 1993 IC] 3, at para. 29, quoting Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania, First Phase, adv. opinion, 1950 ICJ 74, and referring to East Timor (Port. v. Austral.), 1995 ICJ 100, 
Judgment.  
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2.3.3 International Humanitarian Law as a Tool for State Responsibility  
The ILC has frequently referred to international humanitarian law as an example for or as an 
exception to rules contained in the ARSIWA, and international tribunals have applied the rules 
on state responsibility in order to attribute or not to attribute certain violations of international 
humanitarian law to a given state.44 International humanitarian law came into being as law 
regulating belligerent inter-state relations, and thus as a part of the primary - traditional- layer of 
law. Today, however, it is almost inconceivable to apply this field of law unless it is understood 
within the second layer, i.e., as a law protecting victims of armed conflict against states and 
others who wage war. International humanitarian law is thus interesting as it must be 
comprehended and applied with due regard taken to both layers of law.  
Several IHL frameworks impose obligations on states. Under Article 1 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, all states undertake to "ensure respect" for their provisions 
"in all circumstances." This Article is today generally understood as referring to violations by 
other states.45 IHLs dual nature is also evident in this Article, which in some respects, as Sassoli 
notes applies the general rules on state responsibility, while in other respects establishes a special 
secondary rule.46 As such it appears to be both a primary and secondary rule at the same time.  
International humanitarian law doesn’t generally permit any derogation;47 it is, after all, tailored 
for armed conflicts, which by their nature are emergency situations. Considerations of military 
necessity are already taken into account in the context of the "formulation and interpretation of 
the primary obligations."48 
                                                          
44 Genocide case, supra note 22, para. 52; Prosecutor v. Tadic [Tadic case], Case no. IT-94-l-I, ICTY, Decision on 
the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, para. 116-144 (2 Oct. 1995). 
45 Cf.J. Pictet et al., THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY/Iv, GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF  WAR (1958), at 
18; M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch & W.A Solf, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: 
COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 
1949 (1982), at 43; 1. Condorelli & 1. Boisson de Chazournes, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions 
Revisited.: Protecting Collective Interests, IRRC 837 (2000), 67-87.  
46 See M. Sassoli, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 IRRC 846 (2002), 401-
434 at 422.  
47 For exceptions, see, for example, Article 33(2) of First Geneva Convention; Articles 49(2) and (5), 53, 55(3) and 
108(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and Article 54(5) of Additional Protocol I. 
48 ILC,  Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session (23April-1 June and 2 
July-to August 2001), UN Doc. no. A/56/1O, at 206,  para. 20 in Article 25 
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International humanitarian law and the ARSIWA both deal with the duty of states to make 
reparations; Article 31 ARSIWA provides that "the responsible state is under an obligation to 
make full reparation for the injury caused by the  internationally wrongful act," while the duty to 
make reparation for violations of IHL in international armed conflicts is explicitly referred to in 
Article 38 of the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property, as well as implied in the rule of the Geneva Conventions, according to which states 
cannot absolve themselves or another contracting party of any liability incurred in respect of 
grave breaches.49  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 See Article 51 of First Geneva Convention; Article 52 of Second Geneva Convention; Article 131 of Third 
Geneva Convention; Article 148 of Fourth Geneva Convention. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Nature of Refugee Camps 
 
3.1 Overview 
According to the political theorist Hannah Arendt, a ‘refugee’ is a ‘stateless’ or ‘non-citizen’ 
person who threatens the nation-state system.50 Consequently, countries have acknowledged the 
need for a solution to the refugee problem, whose status is considered temporary, with two 
possible options: return to the homeland or country of origin, or naturalization in the host 
country.51 Arendt views the refugee camp as a ‘final solution’ involving the incarceration of 
refugees after denying their citizenship. Only then do they become homo sacer in the sense 
implied by ancient Roman law: destined to die, with their life defined as ‘bare’.52 
”once I accompanied one of our Ministers to the Eastern region, and We all drove out of town to 
look at a new wave of refugees arriving from Eritrea. Before reaching the camp, the Minister – 
who was not familiar with the region - saw a cluster of shelters made of mats and under their 
shade were a number of families with children who were very thin and almost in rags. The 
Minister turned to the Governor of the region and asked him whether these were refugees, and 
the Governor promptly replied. ’No, your Excellency, these are the hosts”.53 
A while back I read the above statement of the former Sudanese Ambassador to Britain, from the 
transcript of the proceedings of the international symposium ’Assistance to Refugees: 
Alternative Viewpoints’, Oxford, March 1984. In my understanding though most people put 
forward similar stories to argue against the rights of refugees or in an attempt to draw a false 
dichotomy between ’hosts’ and ’refugees’. Well in a consequence, it paves a way for the 
inhuman concentration of refugees in camps, as it seems easy to understand and easy to justify.  
 
                                                          
50 Arendt, Hannah. 1966. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company. 
51 Supra note 1. 
52 Supra note 1, at 280 – 283. 
53 Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refugee Programs on Poorer HostsAuthor(s): Robert 
ChambersSource: International Migration Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, Special Issue: Refugees: Issues and Directions 
(Summer, 1986), pp. 245-263 
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3.2 Definition of refugee Camps 
Practically speaking refugee camp refers to designated area/places where refugees live in their 
asylum country. And I couldn’t find a definition of the term ’refugee camp’ in international law. 
However, in most cases it seems there is an agreement between scholars on the main 
characteristics of the refugee camps: the civilian character of its population, issues of freedom of 
movement and the way these camps governed.  
One particular thing about the refugee camps is that the space requires being free from any kind 
of military activities. According to international law and UNHCR guidelines, camps should not 
be located close to the border. Article II(6) of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa states that, "For reasons of security, countries of asylum 
shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country 
of origin."54 This has generally been understood to mean a minimum of fifty kilometers from the 
border. This principle is also reflected in several UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions, 
including the 1987 Conclusion on Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and 
Settlements.55 It should clearly be civilian and humanitarian in its nature. And, as we are going to 
see in the next part of our discussion, this character of refugee camp is firmly grounded on 
international law.  
Let’s break it down the definition and concept of refugee camps first, as it is important part of 
my thesis. First of all there is no definition in international law of the term refugee camps;56 for 
everyone’s surprise the 1951 Refugee Convention and The 1969 OAU Convention makes no 
reference of any kind to refugee ”camps.” However, if we look at the Kampala Convention on 
the Internally Displaced Persons we might be able to get a very short definition of Camps: it 
refers them as “places where internally displaced persons are sheltered.”57  
The 1951 refugee convention makes no reference of any kind to ’refugee camps.’ The 1969 
OAU refugee convention also offers nothing regarding the term ’refugee camp’. If we have to 
mention it, the only major international treaty which merely refers to “places where internally 
                                                          
54 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, ratified 18 October 1972. 
55 Conclusion on Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements, No. 48 (1987), para. (c). 
56 Janmyr,Maja, ’ Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps: Unable and Unwilling States, UNHCR and International 
Responsibility’ International refugee Law Series. 
57 See the Kampala Convention, Article 5(i). 
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displaced persons are sheltered” is the Kampala Convention.58 A comprehensive definition of the 
concept is also difficult to identify within the broader social sciences, and the operational 
definitions of international and non-governmental organizations provide little meaningful 
guidance for our purposes in this thesis. Within the realm of the so-called camp management 
project under the auspices of six international organizations, including UNHCR has been 
developed a single widely accepted operational definition. The term ’camp’ applies to:  
”...a variety of camps or camp-like settings – temporary settlements including planned or self-
settled camps, collective centers and transit and return centers established for hosting displaced 
persons. It applies to ongoing and new situations where due to conflict or natural disasters, 
displaced persons are compelled to find shelter in temporary places.”59 
The lack of a clear definition is particularly disconcerting because the refugee camp "label" may 
confer an array of legal, political and bureaucratic implications for refugee protection. It also 
complicates any attempt of clarifying the underlying objectives of hosting individuals in refugee 
camps; while the very aim of the refugee camp at the outset appears to be the strengthening of 
refugee protection, critics have argued that the objective of such encampment rather seems to be 
to protect states from refugees.60 
Understanding the specific characteristics of a camp is also necessary to understand where 
human rights violations occur, and thus their legality. It is also important to understand why and 
how they are used—in short or long-term situations (where the same rights may be denied, but 
more thoroughly over time and with less justification)—in order to seek alternative solutions. 
While it may be easy to think of a camp in terms of a rigid definition, the idea of a camp is far 
more fluid, and can be understood in different ways according to space, time and culture.  
Some of the key Camp characteristics have been discussed and listed by different experts. 
Although many practitioners and scholars are also discuss “camps” without defining their 
                                                          
58 See the Kampala Convention, Article 5(i), which states that members of armed groups shall be prohibited from, 
among other things, “[v]iolating the civilian and humanitarian character of the places where internally displaced 
persons are sheltered and shall not infiltrate such places.” 
59 See NRC/Camp Management Project, Camp Managment Toolkit (May 2008), at 14. 
60 G. Verdirame, THE UN AND HUMAN RIGHTS, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? (2011), at 238. 
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characteristics in light of other types of settlements.61 According to Jacobson,62 here are outlines 
the various types of settlements that occur:  
• Self-settlements occur when refugees settle amongst the local community without assistance 
from any government or international body. Refugees choose where they live, are able to work 
(though not necessarily legally), and usually do not receive formal protection from UNHCR or 
another body.  
• Assisted settlements are intended to house refugees temporarily, and can be seen in camps and 
local settlements in rural areas, and mass shelters or public buildings in urban areas.  
• Camps are “purpose-built sites, usually close to the border, and thus usually in rural areas”. 
They are meant to be temporary, and thus refugees are not expected to be self-sufficient. They 
are geared toward repatriation, and most are closed, not allowing refugees to come and go freely 
(though it can vary).  
• Local settlements are like camps in that they are planned and segregated villages created 
specifically for refugees, but differ in that they are intended to promote self-sufficiency.  
Jacobsen emphasizes that refugee settlements are “seldom fixed” but are rather formed by “a 
fluid process, in which refugees settle in different situations”.63 For the purposes of this paper, 
camps are seen as different from settlements in that they severely restrict rights and freedoms, in 
particular the freedom of movement and the right to work, which at least the reality in Ethiopia’s 
case. 
 
3.3 The Normativity of Long Term Encampments 
During the Cold War UNHCR became increasingly active with refugees outside of Europe.64 In 
many cases, refugees were political pawns for state ideologies, as states resettled or locally 
                                                          
61 SCHMIDT, A. (2003) ‘FMO Research Guide: Camps Versus Settlements’, Oxford, Forced Migration Online, 
Available from: (accessed 13 May 2009). 
62 JACOBSEN, K. (2001) ‘The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing Countries’, 
Working Paper No. 45. New Issues in Refugee Research, Geneva, UNHCR 
63 Supra note 10, at 8. 
64 LOESCHER, G. (2001) The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Oxford, Oxford UP. 
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integrated refugees who held their same political views.65 However, with the end of the Cold 
War, sentiments toward refugees shifted, and the international community became more 
interested in the containment of refugees in their region of origin.66 Resettlement and local 
integration became less favorable, and refugees were left with temporary asylum in camps with 
no prospect for a long-term solution (Loescher, Betts and Milner 2008).67 In many cases, this 
made encampment more common, particularly in the 1980s in places like Ethiopia, South Africa, 
Pakistan and other parts of South Asia.68 
 
Even though refugee camps are commonly designated as places of temporary shelter, their de 
facto duration is indeterminate. As such, they exist between the temporary and the permanent, or, 
as Agier has articulated, "[a] camp is an emergency intervention that has been on 'stand-by' for 
months or years ...."69 Being characterized as temporary, while in practice often semi-permanent; 
the camp thus constitutes a paradoxical environment, also described by Bauman as "frozen 
transience."70 Today the average lifespan of a refugee camp is 7 years, and UNHCR has coined 
the term "protracted camp" in response to the increasing reality of protracted refugee situations.71 
UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as a situation where "a refugee population of 
25,000 persons or more has been living in exile for five years or longer in a developing 
country:' These protracted situations often have devastating human rights consequences; 
academics and practitioners alike have begun to emphasize the susceptibility of refugees in 
protracted refugee situations to exploitation, negative survival strategies, and to political and 
military movements whose activities conflict with the civilian and humanitarian nature of 
                                                          
65 ROGGE, J. (1981) ‘Africa’s Resettlement Strategies’, International Migration Review 15(1/2): 195-212. 
66 Supra note 12. 
67LOESCHER, G., BETTS, A. and MILNER, J. (2008) The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection in the Twenty-first Century, Routledge: New York. 
68 LOESCHER, G. (2009) Class Lecture: UNHCR and World Politics course, 4 February, Oxford University.  
69 M. Agier, MANAGING THE UNDESIRABLES: REFUGEE CAMPS AND HUMANITARIAN 
GOVERNMENT (2011), at 72. 
70 Z. Bauman. SOCIETY UNDER SIEGE (2002). at 114-115. See also L. Wacquant. Symbolefatal :quand ghetto et prison 
se  ressemblent et s'assemblent, ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALS 139 (2002). 37-55.  
71 Loescher et al. (eds.) PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS: POLITICAL , HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
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refugee camps.72 For these reasons, many have started to question the legality of those long term 
encampments, advocating for regulated time limits.73 
Containment of refugees in refugee camps was favored for several reasons. First and for most, 
developed/western countries “put forward a new state-centric approach, grounded in the 
refugees-as-burdens view”.74 Refugees were seen as “passive aid recipients” at best, and security 
threats at worst (this has been especially the rhetoric of the right wing politicians in recent 
years). In response, donor countries would rather see this “burden” or “drain” in camps overseas 
than at their shores. On the other hand, Host states like Ethiopia and Kenya, for example, chose 
encampment because “…when refugee settlements are more fully serviced by the international 
community, refugees are also less likely to be perceived as a burden by local hosts”.75 This in 
another words meant that in some cases, aid was conditional upon encampment. Merrill Smith 
writes, “When a tight-fisted international community says to a very poor country it will provide 
help for refugees in camps…this evidently encourages that poor country to root out refugees 
who are integrated and plunk them into camps”.76 The view that refugees are a burden is also 
linked to increases in mass influx refugee situations, which encourage encampment as a way to 
control seemingly overwhelming numbers.77  
 
3.4 Problems and Rights Violations in Refugee Camps 
Refugee camps as a space on their own are not necessarily illegal, and I am not arguing that 
camps should never exist according to international law, or that there are not conditions where 
some limitations on refugee rights are acceptable. However, the human rights violations that 
occur because of these Protracted refugee encampments, mainly concerning the right to work 
                                                          
72 A. Slaughter & J. Crisp. A Surrogate State? The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations. UNHCR NEW 
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HUMAN DISPLACEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2006). at 105 
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74 SMITH, M. (2004) ‘Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity’, World Refugee Survey 
2004, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Washington, DC, at 44. 
75 KAISER, T. (2008) ‘Sudanese Refugees in Uganda and Kenya’, in Loescher, G., Milner, J., Newman, E. and 
Troeller, G. (eds.) Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications, New York: 
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76 See Smith (2004), Supra note 23, at 48. 
77 DURIEUX, J. and MCADAM, J. (2004) ‘Non-refoulement through Time: The Case for a Derogation Clause to 
the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies’, International Journal of Refugee Law 16(1): 4-24. 
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and freedom of movement, do provide grounds for questioning the legality of ‘Refugee Camps’ 
itself. One of the well-known scholar on refugee issues, Jeff Crisp, writes that a common 
characteristic of protracted exile “…is the inability of exiled populations to avail themselves of 
basic human rights—including those rights to which refugees are entitled under the provisions of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and other international instruments”.78 
Freedom of movement and the right to work are severely restricted in long-term camp situations, 
and this leads to other rights restrictions. This also proves that they are not consistent with the 
spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention or international human rights norms. Another Refugee 
law scholar writes:  
The tragedy is that the camp that once ensured the life of a refugee becomes, over time, the 
prime vehicle for denying that same refugee the rights to liberty, security of person and other 
rights enshrined both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the refugee 
instruments. The price of extending this short-term measure year after year is paid in terms of 
rights frustrated, capabilities deprived and expectations unmet.79 
 
Similarly, Elizabeth Ferris writes, “Restrictions on employment and on the right to move beyond 
the confines of camps deprive long-staying refugees of the freedom to pursue normal lives and to 
become productive members of their new societies…Containing refugees in camps prevents their 
presence from contributing to regional development and state-building…It also increases the 
vulnerability of refugees to other forms of exploitation”.80 
Currently most refugee influxes, including the one in Ethiopia are dealt with in an ad hoc manner 
at first, only focusing on the most immediate right of non-refoulement, “with relief management 
occurring at the expense of individual rights and freedoms” as Schmidt eloquently described it 
2003: 7).81 In most cases, no legal excuse is given for curtailing the rights stipulated in the 
Convention (Schmidt 2003).82 
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3.5 UNHCR Alternatives to Refugee Camps 
“the best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago, and the second best time is today”. 
We have noticed for decades that the default response for any refugee crisis has been to set up 
refugee camps, which were believed to meet the social and political realities in which refugees 
are living. However, this assertion has been repeatedly proved wrong by a significant body of 
research.   
The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has been working on these issues for long. It 
came up with a new policy statement in 2009, on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas 
which recognized urban areas as ”a legitimate place for refugees to enjoy their rights”.83 In 2014, 
this has taken a significant step by releasing an ”Alternatives to Camps” policy which commits 
the agency to actively pursue alternatives to camps whenever possible. It also clarifies the 
official stand of UNHCR that camps should be a last resort rather than the default response to 
refugee influxes. 84 
This new policy is very deliberately focused on protection and solutions (we can easily grasp that 
idea by simply looking at the title of the document itself) and it tries to link the issue of urban 
refugees directly to the UNHCR mandate. The key element of the policy is to defend the 
freedom of movement of all refugees and defend mobility. It also identifies the most common 
human rights violations that urban refugees confronted in their day to day lives, such as 
detention, harassment, eviction and extortion. It focuses on providing refugees access to the 
livelihood and labor market.  It has also an implication in integrating urban refugees into existing 
public and private services and limiting refugee specific services.  And the beauty of this 
document is, it’s a relatively brave move by UNHCR to commit in providing protection and 
solutions irrespective of national legislations, whether states like it or not. In general, UNHCR 
clearly states in this document the organizations commitment to adapt a more positive, 
contractive and more pro-active that it has been the past in this matter.   
 
                                                          
83 ”Alternatives to refugee camps: Can policy become practice”, by Kristy Siegfried, published at  IRIN website, 
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Chapter Four 
Protection of refugees Under Ethiopian Legal System 
4.1 Overview 
Under this chapter, we shall discuss the legal and institutional framework of Ethiopia regarding 
protection of refugees. Ethiopia has expressed its desire to be part of the effort of the 
international community to protect refugees by signing both the UN and OAU/AU refugee 
convention. Ethiopia has also further shown its concern to protect refugees through its 
constitution which recognizes certain rights of non-nationals and by adopting a proclamation that 
specifically deals with refugees. This chapter shall discuss the place of international and regional 
refuge instruments in Ethiopia, the relevant provisions of the FDRE constitution, the substantive 
and procedural guarantees the proclamation provides for refugees and consider those guarantees 
against the guarantees provided for by the UN and OAU/AU refugee conventions. 
 
4.2 The Available Legal Framework for Refugee Protection 
4.2.1 The Status of International Laws in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees on 10 Nov 1969 and its 
1967 Protocol in Nov 1969.85 It is a party to the convention with reservations to its article 8(that 
obliges states to exempt refugees from measures which may be taken against the person, 
property or interests of nationals of a foreign State), article 9 (that allows states, in time of war or 
other grave and exceptional circumstances, to take provisional measures which it considers to be 
essential to the national security in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by 
the Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such 
measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security), article 17(2)( that prohibits 
states to impose restrictive measures that may be imposed on aliens or the employment of aliens 
for the protection of the national labour market, to refugees) and article 22(that obliges states to 
accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary 
                                                          
85 See UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: State parties to the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol: http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.pdf  
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education ).86 Regionally, Ethiopia is also a party to the 1969 Convention governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (African Refugee Convention).87 
 
Besides these refugee-specific instruments, Ethiopia is also a party to most of international and 
regional human rights and humanitarian law instruments such as International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
International Convention on Torture, Inhuman and Degrading treatment, The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, thereby 
reinforcing protection for refugees. 
 
More importantly, the fact that Ethiopia has committed itself to these refugee instruments both at 
international and regional level demonstrates the desire of the country to assume the shared 
responsibility of protecting those who are in a danger of persecution. Apparently, being a party 
to these regional and international treaties imposes obligation on Ethiopia to respect and protect 
them. This again means that Ethiopia should undertake various measures at a national level 
which may include: domesticating these instruments so that they can be enforced in Ethiopia, 
adopting refugee legislations at a national level, establishing or designating the necessary 
institutions to handle refugee matters etc.   
 
The current Ethiopian constitution under its article 9(4) expressly provides that ‘all international 
agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land’.88 Once the executive 
branch of the government negotiates and signs international treaties, they are expected to be 
presented before the House of Peoples Representatives for ratification. In the normal course of 
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things, after some level of deliberations, these instruments should be adopted which make them 
part of the law of the land. 
 
The same provision of the constitution also provides that ‘the constitution is the supreme law of 
the land. Any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state or a public official which 
contravenes this constitution shall be of no effect.’89 From this one could suggest that 
international and regional refugee conventions are subordinate to the constitution and the latter 
prevails in case the two conflict each other. 
 
On the other hand, Chapter three of the constitution gives a catalogue of human rights.  Article 
13 of this chapter of the constitution provides that ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms 
specified in this chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Human Rights and 
International instruments adopted by Ethiopia’.90 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the constitution demands the long list of human rights under chapter 
three to be interpreted in conformity with international human rights instruments adopted by 
Ethiopia. This means that international human rights instruments including refugee-specific 
human rights are to be taken as a guideline to establish the meaning and content of the rights 
given in chapter three of the constitution. From this, again, one could suggest that as far as 
chapter three rights of the constitution are concerned, the constitution is subordinate to the 
adopted international human rights instruments, particularly where the issue of interpretation 
comes up. 
Substantiating this line of argument, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty”.91 It is; therefore, clear that a domestic law including a constitution 
cannot be a justification for failing to live up to the expectations of international agreements. As 
a corollary, for a state party to perform its international obligations under a treaty, its national 
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laws should be made and interpreted in such a way that they do not go against these international 
commitments. The expression of article 13 of the constitution that the human rights provisions of 
the constitution should be interpreted in compliance with international human rights instruments 
is a keen indication of the enormous interest of Ethiopia to respect these instruments and its 
internal laws should not serve as an impediment to that end.  
 
In sum, it is more tenable to take a position that the human rights provided in the constitution 
that applies to refugees and the refugee proclamation should be interpreted in light of the refugee 
convention, the OAU refugee convention and the international and regional human rights 
instruments Ethiopia is a party to. Doing in the otherwise would expose Ethiopia to a possible 
violation of its commitments at a regional and international level. 
 
4.2.2 Ethiopian Legal and Institutional framework on the Protection of Refugees 
The Ethiopian people have long been known for its hospitality and its governments have shown 
no less of this over the years. According to the UNHCR country report (2015), Ethiopia hosted 
more than 700 thousand refugees and asylum seekers, including about 265,010 Somalis who fled 
the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 or more recent turmoil, about 131,660 Eritrean and about 
350,000 Sudanese who fled the civil war in the south of Sudan.92 
 
The discussion about the legal and institutional framework to protect refugees should start with 
the very fact mentioned above: Ethiopia is a party to the 1951 international refugee convention 
and its additional 1967 protocol; At a regional level, it is a party to the OAU refugee convention 
of 1969.  
 
Furthermore, Ethiopia is also a party to a number of international and regional human rights 
instruments which are meant to protect every individual including refugee. It is shown in chapter 
three that all refuge instruments are nothing but a restatement of refugee-specific human rights 
and, refugee law is a segment of the complex network of human rights law and the two are meant 
to complement each other. 
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We have also seen above that the 1995 Constitution made adopted international agreements an 
integral part of the law of the land and gave the executive and legislative branches specific 
authority to provide asylum. What is more, most of the rights provided under chapter three of the 
constitution are couched in a language which goes as ‘every person’, which may well include 
aliens including refugees. If this understanding is tenable, refugees could benefit from most of 
those human rights in the constitution. On the other hand,  one could also note that some of the 
rights in the constitution seem to be limited to only Ethiopian nationals as these provisions 
employ the phrase ‘every Ethiopian’. Such provisions of the constitution include: article 40(the 
right to ownership of property, article 41(regarding economic, social and cultural rights) and 
article 42(right to work).93 
 
The constitution in its article 32 also expressly provides non- national including refugees the 
freedom of movement within Ethiopia and the freedom to choose residence in the following 
words: "any ... foreign national lawfully in Ethiopia has, within the national territory, the right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence, as well as the freedom to leave the 
country at any time he wishes," but the same provision seems to have reserved the right of re-
entry to nationals.94 
 
As a significant step towards enhancement of refugee protection, as granted by the refugee 
Convention, Ethiopia has also adopted a proclamation (2004) that specifically deals with 
refugees.95 
 
Being a national refugee-specific instrument, the proclamation regulates a fairly wide areas 
related to refugees in almost same language the refugee convention provides. Apart from this, 
unlike many contemporary national refugee instruments, the proclamation does not provide for 
concepts such as internal flight alternative, safe country of origin, safe third country, subsidiary 
and temporary protection. 
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We may say the adoption of this proclamation highlights Ethiopian’s commitment to implement 
its international and regional obligations. Its adoption also facilitates the grant of asylum and the 
protection of refugees. To this effect, the preamble part of the proclamation reads: ‘it is desirous 
to enact national legislation for the effective implementation of the aforesaid international legal 
instruments, establish a legislative and management framework for the reception of refugees, 
ensure their protection, and promote durable solutions whenever condition permit’.96 
 
The proclamation also provides for institutions such as the Administration for Refugee and 
Returnees Affairs (ARRA).  
 
4.2.3 Ethiopia’s Refugee Proclamation 
The 2004 proclamation incorporated refugee definition from both the 1951 Convention and the 
1969 African refugee convention verbatim. Article 4 of the proclamation adopted a combined 
definitions of refugees given by the above two instruments.97 
 
It has been shown in the previous chapters that while the 1951 convention refuge definition has 
been at times considered to be too restrictive, the 1969 OAU definition on the contrary has been 
hailed to be inclusive. The fact that the Ethiopian Refugee proclamation combines the two 
definitions suggests an enormous interest on the part of Ethiopia to be more accommodative and 
more open to the plights of refugees. 
 
The Ethiopian Proclamation does not provide for subsidiary or supplementary protections, a kind 
of scheme that has been developed to extend international protection to individuals who do not 
satisfy the refugee definition but who otherwise need protection. Given the broader definition of 
refugee adopted in the proclamation one may, however, argue that such persons could even be 
subsumed into the definition itself. 
 
Under its Article 19, the proclamation talks about group refugees. The provision reads as 
follows: 
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“…If the Head of the Authority considers that any class of persons met the criteria under Article 
4(3) of this Proclamation, he may declare such class of persons to be refugees.”98 
 
The reading of this provision suggests that a group of persons, whom the authority believes that 
they meet the refugee definition, may be recognized as refugee without even having gone 
through individual refugee determination procedure. In effect, this provision seems to refer to 
what is commonly referred to as prima facie refugee.99 A prima facie approach means the 
recognition by a State or UNHCR of refugee status on the basis of readily apparent, objective 
circumstances in the country of origin or, in the case of stateless asylum seekers, their country of 
former habitual residence. A prima facie approach acknowledges that those fleeing these 
circumstances are at risk of harm that brings them within the applicable refugee definition.100 
Although a prima facie approach may be applied within individual refugee status determination 
procedures (for instance in EU states), it is more often used in group situations, for example 
where individual status determination is impractical, impossible or unnecessary in large-scale 
situations. A prima facie approach may also be applied to other examples of group departure, for 
example, where the refugee character of a group of similarly situated persons is apparent.101 
Regarding some of the refugee rights that are established in this proclamation, we have the 
protection against refoulment as an international preemptory norm. States are obliged both under 
refugee specific and more broadly under international human rights instruments not to expel an 
individual to the place where she or he risks persecution. We also have seen that though this 
obligation suffers certain exceptions under the 1951 convention, it has largely been conceived, 
under human rights instruments, as absolutely absolute.  
 
Article 9 of the proclamation provides for the protection against refoulment in the following 
words:  
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1) No person shall be refused entry in to Ethiopia or expelled or returned from Ethiopia to any 
other country or be subject to any similar measure if as a result of such refusal, expulsion or 
turn or any other measure, such person is compelled to return to or remain in a country where:  
a) the may be subject to persecution or torture on account of his race, religion, nationality', 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion: or 
b) his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened on account of external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination of events seriously disturbing public order in part or whole of 
the country. 
 
As with the 1951 convention, the proclamation, in addition, provides for grounds of exception in 
the following words: 
 
2) The benefit of this provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
serious reasons for regarding as a danger to the national security, or who having been convicted 
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitute a danger to the community. 
 
Clearly, this provision of the proclamation is nothing more than a direct copy of the relevant 
provisions of the 1951 convention and the 1969 OAU Convention.  
 
It is also worth noting that unlike the 1951 convention, the Ethiopian proclamation provides for 
expulsion clause under its article 10 stating that a ‘refugee who is lawfully resident in Ethiopia 
shall not be expelled except on the ground of national security and public order’.102 This clause 
authorizes the concerned authority to expel a refugee on the grounds of national security and 
public order. While it is understandable that a refugee is not protected under the convention 
against refoulement in certain exceptional situations, and same is adopted by the proclamation 
under the non-refoulement clause, providing for another clause on expulsion might be criticized 
as a move to make the exception go wider. 
 
Furthermore, any restriction to the protection against refoulment should be limited to those 
exceptional convention reasons. The trend to expand the exceptions would suggest nothing less 
than going counter to the contemporary understanding of the international community. 
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It is interesting to note that under its sub article 4, the provision of the proclamation envisaged a 
kind of moratorium whereby the decision to expel could be delayed, upon request of the refugee, 
so that a refugee seek admission to a country other than the country to which he is to be 
expelled.103 As shown before, what is prohibited is not only expelling a person to the country 
where he or she risks persecution but also to the country from where that person could 
subsequently be expelled to a place where he or she risks persecution. The sub- article is 
significant in giving a chance to the refugee to look for safe-heavens elsewhere, and extending 
that chance, in effect, will help Ethiopia lives to the obligations of non-refoulemeent as provided 
by a number of international and regional human rights instruments to which it is a party. 
 
As we have seen it above, though an asylum seeker has satisfied the requirement to be 
recognized as a refugee, he or she may be excluded from such status. Exclusion comes after a 
refugee determination is undertaken.104 Exclusion from refugee status is meant to limit protection 
only to those deserving cases and to avoid the possibility of individuals escaping prosecution for 
serious crimes they have committed. 
 
Accordingly, as with the 1951 convention, the Ethiopian Proclamation, under article 5, provides 
for grounds for excluding asylum seekers from refugee status. The grounds of exclusion given in 
the proclamation are similar to the grounds given under the convention except that the 
proclamation provides for one more grounds of exclusion under its sub article 4. This sub article 
provides that a person shall not be considered a refugee if; 
 
4) having more than one nationality, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the 
countries of which he is a national and has no valid reason, for not having availed himself of its 
protection. 
 
One could argue that this sub article is either unnecessary addition to the provision or perhaps 
misplaced. 
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What is provided under this sub article is a component of the definition of refugee under the 
1951 convention as well as the proclamation. Having a dual nationality and a refusal to avail 
oneself of that protection ,without good reason, is and should be an element of a refugee 
determination process and hence should not be raised at exclusion stage. This is because a person 
shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any 
valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of 
the countries of which he is a national.” 105 
 
Such part of the definition of a refugee is intended to deny from refugee status all persons with 
dual or multiple nationalities that can avail themselves of the protection of at least one of the 
countries of which they are nationals. Wherever available, national protection takes precedence 
over international protection.  
 
The Ethiopian proclamation, as with the other international and regional refugee instruments, 
recognizes family unity under its article 12.106 It is part of states humanitarian obligation to allow 
and facilitate the family members of the asylum seeker and refugee join the latter in a country 
where the asylum is sought.107 The proclamation does not limit the right of family unity only to 
refugees. It rather equally recognizes the right of family unity of asylum seekers.108 The family 
members of both asylum seekers and refugees have the right to enter Ethiopia with a view to 
reunite with the asylum seeker and refugee.109 The family members of the asylum seeker enjoy 
same measure of rights the asylum seeker enjoys and if the asylum seeker is found not to deserve 
refugee status, they also loose protection unless otherwise, of course, they are given refugee 
status on their right.110 
 
                                                          
105 Guidance on the interpretation and application of other exclusion clauses can be found in UNHCR, Guidelines on 
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Family members of the refugee are entitled to the same measure of rights a refugee is entitled to 
under the proclamation. Interestingly enough, in order for them to enjoy those rights, they need 
not have to apply for refugee status and need not necessarily have a refugee status themselves, as 
per sub-article 5 of Article 12. The family of asylum seekers and refugees, however, has the right 
not an obligation to apply for refugee status. Though the proclamation does not provide the 
details of how Ethiopia would facilitate family reunification, the fact that the proclamation 
recognizes family unity both for asylum seekers and refugees alike and that they are entitled to 
same rights the refugee has without they having been required to have a refugee status is an 
extremely positive gesture of humanitarianism and is in line with its commitment under the 
convention. 
 
We all agree that the procedure for the application and determination of refugee status should be 
fair. The asylum seeker should be given the opportunity and time to lodge his application before 
a designated authority and the right to a fair hearing. These obligations have been duly 
recognized by international and regional refugee instruments. Similarly, the Ethiopian refugee 
proclamation extends procedural protections to asylum seekers in its provisions 13-18. 
 
The Proclamation, under its article 13, requires asylum seekers to apply for asylum both at the 
frontier and within Ethiopia in 15 days period of time. They can report either at the nearest police 
stations or the office of the authority. The police station receiving the application shall, as soon 
as possible forward the application to the Authority. The applicant shall fill relevant forms and 
vouch for the truth of the statement therein.  Having received the application, the Authority shall 
provide the applicant with identity card attesting to his status as asylum seeker pending refugee 
status determination. 
 
Interestingly enough, unlike the refugee convention which allows for a possibility of detaining 
asylum seekers who are inside the country illegally, the proclamation prohibits both detention 
and criminal prosecution against a person who has applied or is about to apply for refugee status 
on the account of his illegal entry and presence in the country. Seen even from the standard 
provided by the refugee convention point of view, the proclamation is a step ahead as it 
categorically prohibits detention and prosecution of any sort for unlawful entry or presence. 
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According to the 2009 world refugee survey, ‘there were no reports that Ethiopia detained 
refugees or asylum seekers for illegal entry, presence, work, or movement, but the Government 
kept several Eritreans in detention on national security grounds, allowing the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit them.’111 
 
Having received the application of the asylum seekers and issued an asylum seeker with an 
identity card, the Administration of refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) determines the 
refugee status of the applicant.112 In deciding asylum application, the ARRA shall ensure that 
every applicant is given reasonable time to present his case; ensure the presence of qualified 
interpreter during all the stages of the hearing; cause the person concerned to be notified of its 
decision and the reason thereof in writing; decide on every application or case referred to it 
within reasonable period of time; and invite the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees to participate as an observer. 
 
Apart from these procedural guarantees the proclamation does not provide for a right to legal aid, 
an essential component of fair hearing. But one would only hope that an asylum seeker shall be 
given a free legal aid at least in circumstances where this looks imperative to establish the truth. 
 
Several states subject asylum seekers and refugees to different standards of treatment such as 
alien, preferred nation’s nationals and as nationals. The contemporary understanding of the 
refugee convention, however, means that refugees should be entitled more or less to the same 
measure of rights nationals are entitled to.113 In other words, discriminatory treatment between 
nationals and refugees is increasingly becoming unacceptable. 
 
The Ethiopian refugee proclamation, under its article 21, provides that a refugee shall be 
permitted to remain within Ethiopia, issued with identity card and travel document to travel 
outside of Ethiopia.  In practice, the Government and UNHCR jointly adjudicated refugees' 
                                                          
111 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2009 - Ethiopia, 17 June 
2009, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a40d2a594.html [accessed 17 January 2016] 
112 In most of the recent refugee influxes towards Ethiopia from neighboring countries the role of UNHCR is quite 
pivotal and have important role in the decision making process. 
113 See Article 20 the Refugee Proclamation 
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written applications for international travel documents for educational, work-related, or urgent 
personal reasons. 
 
Regarding the practice on the issuance of United Nations Convention Travel Document (CTD), 
when a refugee applies for CTD they need to bring all the necessary documents (it can be 
embassy appointment paper, reason for travel (it could be medical, study or family reunification). 
And the office determines their application for CTD and if it is found genuine, they will be 
referred to ARRA. Then ARRA prepares the Amharic version and send it to Immigration 
Authority in Ethiopia. Last year, UNHCR issued a convention travel document for 
approximately 102 individuals.  
The other thing worth to mention here is that there are circumstances UNHCR help to issue other 
kinds of emergency travel documents. For instance, for the purpose of resettlement, it is laissez-
passer prepared by Ethiopian immigration authority with exit Visa in coordination with IOM 
who transport refugees for RST as per the permission of the resettling country. UNHCR’s role is 
very limited in this process. 
Practically, it seems that expulsion of a recognized refugee on the ground of public or national 
security has never occurred in Ethiopia in a long time. There was only one case whereby a 
recognized refugee from Eritrea who was expelled to Kenya after he was found a threat to 
national security. Awoke Diress, a protection officer working with UNHCR confirms that “I 
know one case: An Eritrean refugee status is revoked due to security reasons, found to be 
involved in Shabia (Eritrean intelligence agency) spy ring. He was taken to court and his status 
was revoked and expelled to Kenya. UNHCR was closely observing the due process of law.” 114  
The proclamation has also reaffirmed that refugees are entitled to the rights recognized under 
both the refugee convention and the OAU refugee convention. Notwithstanding the above, the 
proclamation under its sub article 2 provides that the Head of the Authority may designate places 
and areas in Ethiopia within which recognized refugees, persons who have applied for 
recognition as refugees, and family members thereof shall live, provided that the areas 
                                                          
114 Interview with Awoke Diress, Associate Protection Officer with UNHCR 
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designated shall be located at a reasonable distance from the border of their country of origin or 
of former habitual residence.115 
 
As shown before, the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia clearly provides that ‘any ... foreign 
national lawfully in Ethiopia has, within the national territory, the right to liberty of movement 
and freedom to choose his residence, as well as the freedom to leave the country at any time he 
wishes,’116 but reserved the right of re-entry to nationals.  
 
Clearly, the 2004 Refugee Proclamation gave refugees the right to international travel 
documents, but likewise authorized the head of ARRA to designate areas where refugees and 
asylum seekers must live, thereby imposing residential restrictions.117 This is a clear violation of 
the constitution. And in the situation of a proclamation contradicts the Constitution, it’s 
important to for the government to amend the provisions which are in clear contradiction with 
the supreme law of the land (constitution). 
 
The practice in most of refugee camps is ARRA issued permits specifying the period of travel to 
camp residents for personal, medical, educational, or safety reasons. In general, Ethiopia 
restricted freedom of movement of refugees in camps, with an exception to a very few number of 
refugee who are allowed to live in urban areas.118  
 
Understandably, one could see that there is a general trend of confining refugees to campus. 
Such measures will deprive refugees of a chance to locally integrate with the people of Ethiopia 
and live a normal life free of confinement. Furthermore, such a measure apparently runs counter 
to the country’s obligation to seek and work towards durable solution one of which being local 
integration. 
 
Sub article 3 of Article 21 of the proclamation imposes further restriction on the scope of rights 
refugees could enjoy in Ethiopia in the following words: ‘…Every recognized, refugee, and 
                                                          
115 This the part that authorize the establishment of the Refugee Camps 
116 See the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia Article 11 
117 See Article 2 of the Refugee Proclamation. 
118 It’s an exception in Ethiopia to get Urban Refugee status and mostly for Eritrean refugees. 
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family members thereof shall, in respect to wage earning employment and education, be entitled 
to the same rights and be subjected to the same restrictions as are conferred or imposed generally 
by the relevant laws on persons who are not citizens of Ethiopia.’119 
 
Ethiopia did not allow refugees to work.120 The Government granted work permits to foreigners 
only when there were no qualified nationals available and rarely issued permits to refugees. The 
Government also tolerated some refugees with special skills working illegally. Authorities 
tolerated refugee participation in the informal sector, including trading in markets or doing other 
piecemeal jobs. 
 
The 2004 Proclamation exercised Ethiopia's reservation to the 1951 Convention's right to work, 
placing the same restrictions on refugees as on other foreigners. The Constitution offered only 
citizens the right to run enterprises and reserved other limited property rights to citizens.  
 
As far as the right to education is concerned, the 1995 Constitution limited its offer of equal 
access to publicly funded services to citizens. The 2004 Proclamation exercised Ethiopia's 
reservation to the 1951 Convention's right to primary education, placing the same restrictions on 
refugees and their children as on other foreigners. Once, the UN's Committee for the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination expressed concern about refugee children's enjoyment of their right to 
education and recommended that Ethiopia "adopt adequate measures" to ensure their equal 
access to education.121 
 
 
4.2.4 Administration for Refugee and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) role 
At present, the designated administrative body dealing with refugees in Ethiopia is ARRA, the 
Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs, established under NISS (National Intelligence 
and Security Service, formerly Security, Intelligence and Refugees Affairs Authority). ARRA is 
a de facto responsible for the protection of refugees, including registration, refugee status 
                                                          
119 See Article 21(3) of the Refugee Convention. 
120 The 1995 Constitution offered only citizens the right to work; and also granted them the right to join unions, to 
bargain collectively, and to strike, as well as to other labor rights generally. 
121 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2008 - Ethiopia, 19 June 
2008, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/485f50d171.html [accessed 17 January 2016] 
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determination, the granting of asylum, security and management of refugee protection and 
assistance program.122 Officially, UNHCR has a simple observatory role during a refugee status 
determination process.123 But in practice it is heavily involved in all refugee matters, including 
the financing of ARRA. Both agencies are interdependent as neither is able to accomplish its 
mandate without financial or political support from the other. 
As mentioned above, Ethiopia is signatory to UN refugee convention, the OAU Refugee 
convention and a number of international and regional human rights instruments. We have also 
noted that commitments under these instruments demands Ethiopia to bring its national laws 
inconformity with them and take various measures towards their implementation at a national 
level. 
 
We have seen, in the other section of this chapter, that the constitution contains certain 
provisions that deal with non-nationals and hence refugees. It is also indicated that chapter three 
of the constitution is relevant to refugees and should not be denied. Otherwise, it is expressly 
shown that a right is available only to citizens. One could, thus, see that refuges are protected and 
can avail themselves of the guarantees given by the constitution. 
 
Ethiopia has adopted a refugee proclamation that specifically deals with issues of asylum seekers 
and refugees. Though not a sophisticated and comprehensive instrument, the proclamation 
touches upon and regulates a number of refugee issues. Taking this legislative measure to 
regulate issues of asylum seekers and refugees with a view to protect them is what is expected to 
be undertaken under international refugee instruments by all state parties. 
 
4.2.5 Implementation Drawbacks 
International refugee law and International human rights law do guarantee refugees a range of 
important civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Unfortunately, in Ethiopia these 
                                                          
122 Proclamation No. 6/1995, A Proclamation to provide for the establishment of THE SECURITY, 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS AUTHORITY, establish the power and duties: to cooperate with the 
appropriate organs, to investigate and cause decisions to be taken on the cases of persons who apply for asylum and 
Ethiopian  nationality; and in cooperation with the appropriate organs and international organizations such as 
UNHCR), to be responsible for matters relating to refugees. 
123 Article 14 (2) ( e) and Article 17 (2) of the Refugee Proclamation  
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rights are limited for refugees. As the basic treaty on states obligations vis-a-vis refugees, the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees includes provisions on the treatment that 
states parties must provide to refugees in their territory. At a minimum, the Convention requires 
states to treat refugees as they treat aliens generally and to refrain from discriminating between 
refugees on the basis of their race, religion or country of origin. In addition, the Refugee 
Convention obliges states to provide refugees with administrative assistance, identity papers and 
travel documents. Many of these obligations have been reinforced by statements from UNHCR’s 
Executive Committee. 
The current data shows Ethiopia is one of the biggest UNHCR partner in Africa hosting more 
than 734,000 refugees from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Yemen and other countries. 
As we are speaking about the generosity Ethiopia has extended towards refugees from troubled 
regions of neighboring countries, there are certain standards that country needs to fulfill in 
treatment of these refugees. One among many others is to ensure the freedom and rights of 
movement of every recognized refugee. This is mainly because freedom of movement is an 
especially important issue with regard to protracted refugee situations in countries like Ethiopia, 
with limited national resources and/or limited legal frameworks for protecting refugees who 
nonetheless host large refugee populations. The reality is that refugees don’t have (only limited) 
access to employment and education as they are confined in 24 different refugee camps in the 
country.   
This key right of refugees, freedom of movement within their host country is well described in 
major international human rights treaties. For instance, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Article 12 and Article 26 of the 1951 Convention provides that States shall 
afford refugees the right to choose their place of residence within the territory and to move freely 
within the State. The 2004 Ethiopian refugee proclamation obviously puts the country among 
those who doesn’t respect this right. It specifies that the movement of refugees throughout the 
country may be restricted and that refugees may be limited to living in designated areas, namely 
refugee camps.124 
 
                                                          
124 Ethiopian Refugee Proclamation No. 409/2004 
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Meanwhile, Article 28 obliges States Parties to issue refugees travel documents permitting them 
to travel outside the State “unless compelling reasons of national security or public order 
otherwise require.” Well, the Ethiopian law allows refugees to hold a refugee travel document 
for international travel, although the implementation of this law seems to have ambiguity. The 
rules governing the issuance of travel documents and foreigners’ entry to and exit from Ethiopia 
are contained in the Proclamation Regulating the Issuance of Travel Documents and Visas, and 
Registration of Foreigners in Ethiopia, No. 271/1969, 22 July 1969 and Issuance of Travel 
Documents and Visas Regulations 1971 (date of entry into force: 23 April 1971). 
 
Article 10  
Refugee Travel Document.  
(1)A refugee travel document shall be issued to refugees residing in Ethiopia with the consent of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
(2)Prior to the issuance of refugee travel documents the travel forms for refugees issued by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees shall be filled out and the necessary formalities 
shall be complied with; refugee travel documents may serve for exit or round trip in conformity 
with the request of said High Commissioner. 
 
What I found troubling about these laws are they haven’t changed since the very day of their 
enactment during the Emperor HaileSelasie I era. They need to get updated and amended to fit 
with the current political structure of the country. For instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not 
anymore responsible in issuing any kind of passport in the country, as the task took over by the 
Main Department of Immigration and Nationality Affairs. Moreover, this law seems inactive in 
general and there is no clear guideline available to refugee who wants to access this right?  
Unfortunately, it isn’t possible for the writer to access the statics with The Main Department of 
Immigration and Nationality Affairs regarding number of Refugee Travel Documents that have 
been issued by Ethiopian government or any sort, except the one that I mentioned above.  
The limitations on freedom of movement couples with lack opportunities for gainful employment 
in Ethiopia prompts many refugees to engage in risky secondary movements to other countries. 
The only exceptional case is the 2010 refugee policy specifically towards Eritrean refugees, by 
establishing the ‘out-of-camp’ scheme through which Eritreans are allowed to live and study 
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outside the camps if they are able to sustain themselves independently (usually through relatives 
or remittances).  This policy allows Eritrean refugees with no criminal record, and who are now 
living in the camps, to move to any part of Ethiopia, provided they are able to sustain themselves 
financially or have sponsors willing to support them. Eritrean refugees are even allowed to 
access higher education, through an agreement with the Ethiopian Administration for Refugees 
and Returnee Affairs (ARRA). About 3,000 Eritrean refugees have benefited from the scheme so 
far and the initiative has been widely praised as a welcome step beyond a strict camp policy. The 
problem is it ignores the vast majority of refugee groups in Ethiopia which happened to be South 
Sudanese and Somali refugees for unknown reason (maybe for political reasons). It only benefits 
Eritrean refugees and they are the third largest refugees in the country with a total numbers of 
about 147,000 thousand.  
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Chapter Five 
Identifying refugee camp responsibility: Host state and UNHCR 
5.1 The Primary Rules and Host States  
The primary responsibility for the physical safety of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
and the maintenance of the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps, is generally 
perceived to rest with the host state. This responsibility is in part based on the principle of state 
sovereignty, which for centuries has been the basis of international law.125 Refugee camps are 
normally established with the consent of the host state (see Chapter Three), and while the 
administration of refugee camps by UNHCR and its implementing partners may deprive the state 
of the capacity to govern a certain part of its territory, in a strictly legal sense, these camps do not 
challenge the host state's sovereignty. Yet, as we will be emphasizing later throughout this 
chapter, evidence suggests that the host state is often unwilling or unable to adequately protect 
the refugees in these camps. A few examples illustrate this conundrum:  
5.1.1 Pugnido Camp in Ethiopia 
Pugnido is the oldest refugee camp in the Gambella Region of Western Ethiopia, and is hosting 
both refugees that arrived twenty years ago (since 1993) and those who arrived within recent 
months (after 15th December 2013). There are also refugees who arrived in 2012 following 2011 
tribal conflict in Jonglei Sate of South Sudan. Since 18 Nov, 2014, some 16,183 refugees 
relocated from different entry points arrived in Pugnido of which 14,746 have been fully 
registered (level II).  
The UNHCR field office in Pugnido is responsible for the overall coordination and supervision 
of refugee assistance programs in the camp. It provides guidance and support to all the other 
implementing partners in the camp. The UNHCR office is represented by a field officer, who 
leads the UNHCR activities in the camp together with a protection, community service and 
registrations associates and assistants. 
                                                          
125 See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. u.s.) P.c.I.].. 2 RIAA 829 (1928). at 838; R. Jennings & A Watts (eds.), 
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw: PEACE (2008). at 122. 
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At the top level, UNHCR, together with ARRA will enter into tripartite agreements with 
ministries and agencies at the federal and regional level and with relevant local and international 
agencies to implement and/or fund any kind of refugee programme in Ethiopia. On behalf of the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, the Administration for Refugee and Returnee 
Affairs (ARRA) is entrusted by National Intelligence and Security Affairs Authority to play both 
the role of the government and implementing partner of UNHCR Representation in Ethiopia.  
ARRA in close co-operation with UNHCR Representation in Ethiopia assumes the responsibility 
of overall International Protection and Co-ordination of the refugee and returnee assistance 
programme in Ethiopia.   
Protection & Community Services Activities are distributed to different actors in Pugnido.  
Camp management and security is assigned to the main government partner ARRA.  Other 
protection related activities such as, sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) prevention and 
response services, support for person with disability and other vulnerable groups to one of the 
local NGO’s called RaDO (Rehabilitation and Development Organization), Child Protection to 
Save the children (SCI),  Capacity building trainings on SGBV by a UNHCR field office and 
RaDO. 
UNHCR in coordination with ARRA conducts a joint regular monitoring exercise of the overall 
project implementations carried out in Pugnido refugee camp. ARRA will also provide monthly 
and quarterly reports to UNHCR Field Unit and Sub-Office and jointly conduct mid-year review 
and annual evaluation.  In most of the cases, ARRA and UNHCR jointly monitor the project 
implementations carried out by other actors. 
The writer of this thesis went to Pugnido Camp in a UNHCR assignment and stayed there for 
about a year. During my times there, I have witnessed the several attacks at Pugnido refugee 
camp in Ethiopia's Gambella that were sparked by ethnic tensions between the local Agnuak 
tribes and South Sudanese refugees who belong to Nuer tribe. The Ethiopian government and 
UNHCR have been trying to mitigate the tension in different ways. I have been part of some of 
the discussions that put forward some recommendations for a long term solutions following the 
violent ethnic attacks who claimed lives of innocent refugees. Ethiopian government has 
reportedly charged to court those accused of the killings. At some point, UNHCR tried to 
relocate refugees to new site at Odier in western Ethiopia. The site chosen based on its 
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accessibility, proximity to administrative and security establishments, and the tribal composition 
of local residents. Although, it didn’t seem enough to halt potential attacks on refugees. Just in 
the first month of 2016, deadly clashes occurred in the Ethiopian region of Gambella between the 
two major communities of Nuer and Anyuak in the area. Armed youth groups from Anyuak 
community from Gok Woreda of Gambella region stormed Pugnido Refugees Camp – inhabited 
by Nuer refugees – in a rampant killing of unarmed Nuer refugees in what is viewed as the 
continuation of Gambella incident where the Anyuak killed the Nuer in a fight triggered by the 
land dispute. The blocks in the camp occupied by Lou Nuer and Gajiok Nuer were the ones hit 
the hardest by rowdy Anyuak youth.   
5.1.2 Other Security Breach Examples 
The under mentioned examples didn’t happen in Ethiopia, although I wanted them to include 
here for two main reasons. Ethiopia has its own refugee proclamation and deals with hundreds of 
thousands of refugees in its own way. However, the underlining facts about refugee camps 
situations and the politico-security atmosphere are not yet different from the countries that the 
other incidents happened. Hence, by taking those high profile examples from the region we can 
easily relate to our situation in Ethiopia and make our point. And the other importance is that by 
drawing a distinction between these examples we will be able to determine to what extent these 
actors lays a responsibility to the State, UNHCR and its partners. 
In August 2008, members of the Sudanese Government's security forces attempted to enter 
Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur, Sudan. The forces were trying to execute a search warrant, but 
were prevented from doing so by a crowd of IDPs of which many were children. Following this 
resistance, the security forces fired shots in the air and thereafter opened fire on the crowd, 
killing at least 32 civilians and injuring 108.126 That couldn’t be justified in any circumstance and 
those who perpetrated these horrible acts should have been faced justice. Shouldn’t be the 
Sudanese government held accountable? How was it possible for them to get away with it?  
                                                          
126 See UN OHCHR. Eleventh Periodic Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan: Killing and injuring of civilians on 25 August 2008 by government security 
forces: Kalma lDP camp, South Darfur; Sudan (2009). See also K. Reyes. Right and Responsibilities in Darfur. 
FMR 33 (2009). at 67; AI. Sudan: Amnesty International Deplores Loss of Life in Kalma Camp, Darfur. AI Index: 
AFR 54/038/2008 (2008). 
52 
 
Four years earlier, on the night of 13 August 2004, a UNHCR administered camp housing 
Congolese refugees at Gatumba, in Burundi, was attacked by a group of armed individuals.127 
Despite the fact that more than 100 Burundian soldiers had been alerted at the beginning of the 
attack and were stationed in the camp's immediate proximity, a total of 152 Congolese refugees 
were killed and more than 100 were wounded.128 
Two years before the Gatumba massacre, in August 2002, Achol-pii camp in northern Uganda 
was attacked by rebels from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).129  More than 55 Sudanese 
refugees were killed and many more injured or abducted, including staff of UNHCR's 
implementing partner, the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Prior calls to relocate the 
camp population, which had suffered repeated rebel attacks over the years, had fallen on deaf 
government ears, and the remaining Achol-pii refugees were forced to choose between 
remaining in the camp or returning to conflict-stricken Sudan - from where they initially had 
fled. Following the attack in 2002, the refugees fled Achol-pii and sought refuge in 
Kiryandongo camp, in Masindi, a safer district of Uganda. However, the following year the 
Ugandan government forcibly relocated 16,000 refugees back to camps in the country's 
volatile north. In addition to these armed attacks and forced relocation, the Ugandan government 
tolerated, and at times even assisted, SPLA’s militarization of the northern Ugandan refugee 
camps, a practice which had severe effects on the basic rights of the Sudanese refugees.  
Apart from demonstrating the necessity of upholding the civilian and humanitarian character of 
refugee camps, what, then, do the above examples illustrate? The examples trigger a number of 
important questions with regard to the responsibility of host states, and, not the least, questions 
concerning the responsibility of, on the one hand, the unable state, and, on the other hand, the 
unwilling state. The above examples exemplify that refugees and IDPS have suffered human 
rights violations in the hands of non- state actors, conduct which the host state may choose to 
tolerate or neglect. Thus, the first question to be attended to in this chapter is essentially when is 
a conduct or wrongdoing attributable to the host state? More specifically, under what 
circumstances shall the state be held accountable for the acts of its security forces, such as in the  
                                                          
127 See generally UNSC. UN Doc. no. S/2004/821 (2004); HRW. Burundi: The Gatumba Massacre (2004). 
128 See UNSC, id. at 16, paras. 79-80. 
129 See generally T. Kaiser, The Experience and Consequence of Insecurity in a Refugee Populated Area in Northem 
Uganda 1996-7, 19 RSQ 1 (2000),38-53. 
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Kalma camp situation? What if these forces acted ultra vires? And shall the state really be 
responsible for the conduct non-state actors who attack refugee camps, as in the examples of 
Pugnido, Gatum and Achol-pii?  
It is arguable that issues of responsibility for human rights violations in refugee camps may best 
be explored through an application of the rules of state responsibility. The principles regarding 
state responsibility, considered part of customary international law,130 regulate the circumstances 
under which a state can be held accountable for a breach of an international obligation and were 
in 2001 adopted in the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA or Articles on State Responsibility).131 
According to these rules, the international responsibility of a state arises from the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act and, in order to determine whether there has been such a breach, 
two strands of inquiry must be pursued: firstly, whether there is conduct consisting of action or 
omission that is attributable to a state under international law, and secondly, whether this conduct 
also constitutes a breach of the international obligations of the state,132 This chapter will discuss 
on questions of attribution, and as such, is based upon a presumption that an internationally 
wrongful act has been committed.133  
In view of the many cases in which host states have proved unwilling or unable to provide 
adequate protection, it is furthermore necessary examine whether there are any possible 
justifications or excuses which may preclude responsibility. This chapter asks: does international 
law impose full responsibility for refugee protection upon states regardless of the state’s capacity 
to fulfill these obligations? Can there not be circumstances in the above examples of Sudan, 
Uganda or Ethiopia, which may absolve the host state from this responsibility? In short: when a 
violation has occurred, do the international laws on responsibility distinguish between a state 
unable to provide protection, and a state unwilling to do so? While the above example seem to 
                                                          
130 See R. McCorquodale & P. Simons, Responsibility beyond Borders, 7 MLR 4 (2007), 598-625 at 601; E. 
Lauterpacht & D. Bethlehem, The Scope and Content~ the Principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion, in E. Feller et al. 
( eds.), REFUGEE PROTECTION INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR'S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (2003),87-177 at 115.  
131 ILC, Report of the ILC, 53rd Session, YlLC II, part 2, 2001, at 26-143. See also example J. Crawford, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON SUTE RESPONSIBJUTI TEXT AND 
COMMENTARIES (2002).  
132 See ARISWA, Article 12,2. 
133 Maja Janmyr, PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN REFUGEE CAMPS: Unable and Unwilling States, UNHCR and 
International Responsibility, International Refugee Law series, Section 3.4. 
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give evidence of a lack of will on the part of the state to adequately protect the lives of 
individuals on its territory, in other cases many states simply lack the capacity or resources to 
adequately attend to insecurity or violations within refugee camps. After all, an ever-increasing 
proportion of the refugee protection burden is currently carried by financially weak states in the 
majority world, such as Kenya and Ethiopia.134 Moreover, the states to which refugees flee are 
often close to or bordering on the states of origin and may also suffer from instability or conflict, 
which may further aggravate the host state's capacity to respond to refugee insecurity.  
This reality leads us to another issue to be dealt with in this chapter, namely that concerning 
shared responsibility. Human rights, including refugee protection, are no longer considered 
solely the internal affairs of each sovereign state; refugee protection in its very essence 
challenges state sovereignty in that it provides a safety net to those who have been denied 
protection from their state of origin.135 Goodwin-Gill articulates this actuality as follow:  
The refugee in international law occupies a legal space characterized, on  
the one hand, by the principle of state sovereignty and the related prin-  
ciples of territorial supremacy and self-preservation; and, on the other  
hand, by competing humanitarian principles deriving from general inter-  
national law ... and from treaty.136 
Because the roles of actors other than the host state are critical when it comes to refugee 
protection, I ask, under what circumstances can the host state's primary responsibility be shared 
with other actors, i.e. UNHCR or non-governmental organizations, present in the refugee camps? 
Before I embrace these interesting questions, however, I will expound upon the system of state 
responsibility more generally.  
As highlighted in chapter two of this paper, within the system of international responsibility, 
"state responsibility" covers the field of the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful 
                                                          
134 According to UNHCR, 22 percent of the global refugee population had in 2006 sought asylum in the 50 Least 
Developed Countries, and 80 percent of the world's refugees were in 2009 hosted by states in the majority world. 
See UNHCR, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2009: 'TRENDS IN DISPLACEMENT, PROTECTION AND 
SOLUTIONS (2010), at 7; UNHCR, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2006: TRENDS IN DISPLACEMENT, 
PROTECTION AND SOLUTIONS (2007), at 8. 
135Refugees have, however, crossed borders and are outside their states of origin. On the other hand, the situation for 
internally displaced persons differs in that these IDPS remain within the territory of the state, and their protection is 
in principle a function of domestic jurisdiction.   
136 G. Goodwin-Gill, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1996), at V. 
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conduct. It is thus understood as the body of principles which determines when and how one 
state may be liable to another for breach of an international obligation. The rules of state 
responsibility do not set forth any particular obligations but rather determine when an obligation 
has been breached and the legal consequences of that violation. The rules are as such 
"secondary" that address basic issues of responsibility and remedies available for breach of 
"primary" or substantive rules of international law (see Chapter two). They establish the 
conditions for an act to qualify as internationally wrongful; the circumstances under which 
actions of officials and other actors may be attributed to the state; general defenses to liability; 
and the consequences of liability.  
What is a breach of international law by a state depends on what its international obligations are. 
The state's obligation may derive either from treaty or customary international law. Together 
with the doctrine of equality, the principle of state sovereignty provides that all states have the 
same rights and obligations, and, in addition to rules of a customary law character, each state is 
only bound by a legal obligation to which it has submitted.137 In the Rainbow Warrior case, the 
arbitral tribunal explained that:  
The general principles of International Law concerning State responsibility are equally 
applicable in the case of breach of treaty obligation ... so that any violation of a State of 
any obligation, of whatever origin gives rise to State responsibility.138 
This, then, seems to imply that a state which is in breach of any obligation to which it is bound 
under international law, can be held responsible under the general principles of state 
responsibility. In addition to the provisions found in the specific legal conventions pertaining to 
human rights and refugees, the most basic norms of international humanitarian and international 
human rights law are today considered part of international customary law, binding on all states. 
Specific protection standards for refugees are established primarily by the 1951 Refugee 
                                                          
137 Consequently, each sovereign state possesses tile full capacity to enjoy tile following attributes of its 
sovereignty; tile right to conclude treaties (jus tractatuum), the right to accredit diplomats (jus legationis), the right 
to declare war (jus belli), and tile right to be party to legal proceedings (in particular tile Court of Justice). See also 
D. Shelton, Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of'Soft Law', in D. Shelton (ed.), COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
(2000),1-42 at 5. 
138 Rainbow Warrior case (NZ. v. Fr.) (1990),20 RlAA 215, at 251 (para. 75). 
56 
 
Convention,139 but are also found in regional instruments such as the 1969 OAU Refugee 
Convention and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. The state's responsibility to uphold the 
civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps is articulated in a number of legal fora, 
ranging from treaty law and Security Council resolutions to material of a more soft law 
character, such as conclusions by UNHCR's Executive Committee and UNHCR's own 
handbooks.140 Thus, there appears to be a wide legal framework holding states responsible for 
the human rights protection of all individuals, even those in refugee camps, within its territory.  
As a result of such responsibility, the wrongdoing state is also under a secondary obligation to 
cease the wrongful conduct and to make full reparation for any injury caused thereby.141 To the 
extent that a wrongdoing state does not acknowledge its responsibility for an internationally 
wrongful act and therefore fails to comply with the secondary obligations resulting from that 
responsibility, two methods of implementing state responsibility contemplated in the ARSIWA 
are (i) the invocation of responsibility and (ii) the adoption of counter measures.142  A formal 
invocation of state responsibility includes (but is not limited to) filing an application before a 
competent international tribunal.  
Although the Articles on State Responsibility are general in coverage, they do not necessarily 
apply in all cases.143 Particular treaty regimes have established their own special rules of 
responsibility and contain tailor-made rules on the legal consequences of breach. The ARSIWA 
open the door to such special sets of rules in Article 55:  
These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act or the content implementation of the international responsibility of a 
State are governed by special rules of international law.  
The ILC introduced this lex specialis principle as a tool for connecting ill rules of state 
responsibility with other regimes of international law. However, it has become one of the most 
debatable provisions of the ARSIWA. The distinction between primary and secondary rules has 
                                                          
139 As we know, however, none of these standards explicitly relate to the physical security of refugees, but rather 
deal with issues such as religious freedom, employment, education and social security. See for instance, Article 7 of 
the 19S1 Refugee Convention.  
140See the Kampala Convention, Article 9(2)(g); UNSC, UN Doc. no. S/RES/1208 (1998); S/RES/126S (1999); 
1674 (2006). See also UNGA, UN Doc. no. A/RES/SO/1S2 (1996); A/RES/S9/172 (200S); A/RES/60/128 (2006).  
141 ARISWA, Article 30(A) and 31.  
142 ARISWA, part 3.  
143 See Crawford, The International Law Commission’s, supra note 7, at 124. 
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not always been easy to apply, and discussions have concerned whether or not certain aspects of 
the rules on state responsibility, notably circumstances precluding wrongfulness and 
countermeasures, in fact are primary rules.144 The application of the lex specialis principle has 
also been controversial with regard to subsystems that have attained a particularly high degree of 
autonomy.145 The more the system is "closed" towards its international law environment, the less 
likely it is to fall back on the rules on state responsibility. As Simma and Pulkowski correctly 
ask, when exactly can it be said that one rule is more special than another, and how far does the 
specialty extend.146 While it appears generally accepted that the generalia rule can only apply 
where both the specific and general provision concerned deal with the same subject matter, 
determining whether a special norm relates to the same subject-matter as ARSIWA can be 
problematic. And if a special norm is considered to concern the same subject matter as 
ARSIWA, how far does the specialty of that particular norm extend?  
Simma and Pulkowski suggest that one applies a sliding scale of specialty where at the one end 
there is a legal provision that is only designed to replace a single provision of the ARSIWA, and 
at the other end, a strong form of lex specialis could exclude the application of ARSIWA 
altogether. This latter form of Lex specialis is often denoted as a "self-contained regime," a term 
coined by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the SS Wimbledon case.147 The main 
characteristic of such a self-contained regime appears to be its intention to exclude completely 
the application of the ARSIWA. In practice, however, it appears as if few treaty regimes, if any 
at all, actually contain a catalogue of secondary rules that would consistently correspond with the 
secondary rules provided in the ARSIWA. It is therefore arguable that the ARSIWA are largely 
applicable also to violations of international human rights-, humanitarian-, and refugee law.148 
Without discussing closer whether or not international human rights-, humanitarian- and refugee 
law constitute self-contained regimes and thus include far-reaching leges speciales vis-a-vis 
ARSIWA, this following section offers an overview of how the various fields of law may serve as 
tools for state responsibility, independent of the ILC'S rules on state responsibility.  
                                                          
144 For this discussion, see E. David, Primary and Secondary Rules, in J. Crawford et al. (eds.), THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2010), 27-33 at 29ff.  
145 B. Simma & D. Pulkowski, Leges Speciales and Self-Contained Regimes, in J. Crawford et al. (eds.), THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2010). at 139-140. 
146 Ibid, at 141. 
147 Ibid, at 142. 
148 S.S. Wimbledon case, 1923, PCl] REPORTS, Series A, at 15, 24 
58 
 
5.1.3 Attribution of Conduct to the State  
A state is accountable first of all for the conduct of all its organs. This general rule is found in 
Article 28 of the ICESCR and Article 50 of the ICCPR, which stipulate that their provisions 
extend "to all parts of federal states without any limitations or exceptions." Article 3 of the 
Fourth Hague Convention and Article 91 of Additional Protocol I similarly provide that a state is 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. For our case 
examples of non-international armed conflict, the rule that would be appropriate is going to be 
Rule 149 of ICRC’s study on Customary law: 
Rule 149. A State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law attributable to 
it, including:  
             (a) violations committed by its organs, including its armed forces;  
             (b) violations committed by persons or entities it empowered to exercise  
                  elements of     governmental authority;  
             (c) violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions,  
                  or under its direction or control; and  
             (d) violations committed by private persons or groups which it acknowledges  
                  and adopts as its own conduct.  
[IAC/NIAC] 
 
The ARSIWA reflects these rules and stipulates that a state will normally only be liable for the 
conduct of its organs or officials, acting as such. Specifically:  
The conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that state under international law, 
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive judicial or any other functions, whatever 
position it holds in the organization of the state, and whatever its character as an organ of the 
central government or of the territorial unit of the state 
 
An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law 
of the state. Therefore, in the Kalma camp incident of 2008, the state of Sudan is clearly 
responsible for the conduct of its own security forces. Whether the use of legal force was 
necessary and proportionate, as the government argued, is another matter (refer chapter two). In 
the case of Pugnido and Gatumba, states have an obligation to guarantee the safety of the 
refugees. Otherwise the sates who failed to protect refugees could be blamed. 
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5.2 UNHCR 
5.2.1 Mandate and Autonomy 
In 1946, the UN General Assembly established the International Refugee Organization (IRO) as 
a Specialized Agency of the United Nations of limited duration. Having regard to the prospective 
termination of the mandate of the IRO and the continuing concerns over refugees, the United 
Nations General Assembly, by Resolution 319 (IV) of 3 December 1949, decided to establish a 
High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees ‘to discharge the functions enumerated [in the Annex 
to the Resolution] and such other functions as the General Assembly may from time to time 
confer upon it’. By Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. UNHCR was thus established as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General 
Assembly pursuant to Article 22 of the UN Charter. Paragraph 1 of the UNHCR Statute 
describes the functions of the UNHCR as follows: 
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of the General 
Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the 
United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent 
solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments and, subject to the approval of the 
Governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or 
their assimilation within new national communities. 
 
Paragraph 6 of the Statute identifies the competence of UNHCR ratione personae as extending 
to any person: 
 
who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no nationality, the country of his former 
habitual residence, because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or, if he has 
no nationality, to return to the country of his former habitual residence. 
 
Paragraph 7 of the Statute indicates exceptions to the competence of UNHCR including any 
person in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a 
crime covered by the provisions of treaties of extradition or a crime mentioned in article VI of 
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the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal or by the provisions of article 14, 
paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
The function and competence of UNHCR is thus determined by reference to the particular 
circumstances of the persons in need of international protection. It is not determined by reference 
to the application of any treaty or other instrument or rule of international law, by any temporal, 
geographic, or jurisdictional consideration, by the agreement or acquiescence of any affected 
State, or by any other factor. 
 
UNHCR’s mandate is to provide international protection inter alia to persons who are outside 
their country of origin in consequence of a well-founded fear of persecution and who come 
within the other requirements of paragraph 6B of the Statute and are not otherwise excluded 
from UNHCR competence by the terms of paragraph 7 of the Statute. 
 
Paragraph 9 of the Statute provides that UNHCR ‘shall engage in such additional activities . . . as 
the General Assembly may determine’. The General Assembly has over the past several years 
extended UNHCR’s competence to encompass all categories of persons in need of international 
protection who may not fall under the Statute definition and has affirmed the breadth of the 
concept of ‘refugee’ for these purposes. For example, initially through the notion of UNHCR’s 
good offices but later on a more general basis, refugees fleeing from generalized situations of 
violence have been included within the competence of the UNHCR. 
 
By 1992, a Working Group of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme 
was able to describe UNHCR’s mandate in the following terms: 
 
The evolution of UNHCR’s role over the last forty years has demonstrated that the mandate is resilient 
enough to allow, or indeed require, adaptation by UNHCR to new, unprecedented challenges through 
new approaches, including in the areas of prevention and in-country protection. UNHCR’s humanitarian 
expertise and experience has, in fact, been recognized by the General Assembly as an appropriate basis 
for undertaking a range of activities not normally viewed as being within the Office’s mandate. The Office 
should continue to seek specific endorsement from the Secretary-General or General Assembly where 
these activities involve a significant commitment of human, financial and material resources. 
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The Working Group confirmed the widely recognized understanding that UNHCR’s competence 
for refugees extends to persons forced to leave their countries due to armed conflict, or serious 
and generalized disorder or violence [even though] these persons may or may not fall within the 
terms of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. From the 
examination of the common needs of the various groups for which the UNHCR is competent, it 
is clear that, with protection at the core of UNHCR’s mandate, displacement, coupled with the 
need for protection, is the basis of UNHCR’s competence for the groups. The character of the 
displacement, together with the protection needed, must also determine the content of UNHCR’s 
involvement. 
 
The Working Group considered that the same reasoning held true for persons displaced within 
their own country for refugee-like reasons. While the Office does not have any general 
competence for this group of persons, certain responsibilities may have to be assumed on their 
behalf, depending on their protection and assistance needs. In this context, UNHCR should 
indicate its willingness to extend its humanitarian expertise to internally displaced persons, on a 
case-by-case basis, in response to requests from the Secretary-General or General Assembly. 
Although UNHCR is accorded a special status as the guardian of the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, it is not limited in the exercise of its protective 
functions to the application of the substantive provisions of these two treaties. UNHCR may 
therefore rely on whatever instruments and principles of international law may be pertinent and 
applicable to the situation which it is called upon to address.  
 
5.2.2 UNHCR’s International Responsibility and ARIO 
Some of the questions we are going to pose in this part of the paper are: under what 
circumstances may UNHCR bear international responsibility under the ILC'S Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations for human rights violations in the context of 
refugee camps? For instance, does UNHCR hold any independent responsibility or shall 
responsibility be attributed to the UN as a whole? Can this responsibility be shared with other 
actors?  
The International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (ARIO) were adopted by the ILC in the summer of 2011 following a ten year 
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process.149 In December 2011, the UN General Assembly annexed the ARIO to Resolution 
66/100, in which it also welcomed the conclusion of the ILC'S work in this regard and its 
adoption of the ARIO and a detailed commentary on the subject.150  
The ARIO are as such a relatively new type of laws in the landscape of international law and the 
ILC'S efforts to develop ARIO have been the subject of much critical commentary by states, 
international organizations and scholars alike. The main criticisms of the Articles concern on the 
one hand the diversity of international organizations today, and, on the other hand, the general 
lack of practice to support the contents of the ARIO.151 Unlike states, which are "juridically 
equal," international organizations are diverse in their size, function and mandate. International 
organizations have for this reason argued that it will be difficult to elaborate a "one size fits all" 
set of principles that can apply for all international organizations.152  Nevertheless, such views 
hold little water - after all, states are also extremely diverse. What states have in common, 
however, is their "statehood" and the fact that they are subjects of international law. International 
organizations as defined in the ARIO also have something in common; they are 
intergovernmental in their character and subject of international law, which means that they 
concentrate otherwise independent state functions.153  In fact, d'Aspremont and Ahlborn have 
found that the ARIO  
... strike a reasonably astute balance between institutional heterogeneity and the need for 
overarching secondary rules governing the responsibility of all institutional subjects of 
international law.154  
 
                                                          
149 On ILC'S work on state responsibility, see Chapter 4. See lLC, Report of the International Law Commission on 
the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session (26 Apr.-3June and 4JUIy-12 Aug. 2011), UN Doc. no. A/66/w (20n), para. 87; 
UNGA Res. 66/100 (2012); UNGA Res. 66/98 (2012).  
150UNGA, UN Doc. no. A/RES/66/wo (2012), para. 1. See also UNGA, UN Doc. no. A/RES/66/98 (2012), para. 4.  
151 See generally K Boon, New Directions in Responsibility: Assessing the International Law Commission's Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 37  YJIL ONLINE.  
152 See, for instance, comments of the European Commission in Report of the ILC, Responsibility of International 
Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, 63rd Session, 1Z, UN Doc. 
no. A/CN.4/637 (Z011), at 7. 
153 Nevertheless, the ILC Commentary to ARIO also acknowledges this diversity and asserts that the ".. articles 
where appropriate give weight to the specific character of the organization, especially to its functions, as for instance 
art. 8 on excess of authority or contravention of instructions" See ILC Commentary, in ILC, Report on the Sixty-
Third Session (Z011), supra note 1, para. 7. 
154 See J. Aspremont & c. Ahlborn, The International Law Commission Embarks on the Second Reading of Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, EJIL TALK (16 May Z011). 
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A more pressing matter concerns the lack of practice to support the rules and the ARIO'S 
resemblance to the ILC'S work on state responsibility. In contrast to the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which referred to existing 
rules and largely codified customary international law, the ARIO were drafted without extensive 
practice to draw from. This is largely due to the fact that because international organizations 
enjoy generous grants of immunity both as institutions and for their individual agents, there are 
few cases where principles of responsibility have been invoked before any national or 
international courts. National courts generally recognize the immunity of international 
organizations under binding treaties, such as the UN Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations of 1946, which grants the UN absolute immunity. It is thus 
difficult for claimants to secure a judicial remedy against officials of international 
organizations.155 Furthermore, only states can be parties to cases before the International Court 
of Justice, and the only rare example of an international organization being sued in court is 
probably suits against EU institutions within the European Court of Justice. For these reasons, 
some have argued that the lack of practice when it comes to the responsibility of international 
organizations encouraged the ILC to replicate large parts of ARSIWA. In the view of Alvarez, 
the ILC sometimes simply replaced "state" with "international organization, the rationale for this 
being the "ILC'S assumption that since states and International Organizations are both legal 
persons or subjects of international law, the same rules should presumptively apply to both,”156 
The effects of such a "cut and paste" operation have been feared by some to be far-reaching, in 
particular since the results of applying the rules on countermeasures, force majeure and necessity 
to international organizations are indefinite.157 Others, however, have argued that the ARIO only 
partly mirror the ARSIWA and that "the differences between the two are too often 
underestimated."158 
 
                                                          
155 See A. Reinisch, The Immunity of International Organizations and the jurisdiction of Their Administrative 
Tribunals, 7 CJIL Z (zoo8), 285-306. See also Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir.1983). 
156 See J. Alvarez, Misadventures in Subject hood, EJIL TALK (Z9 Sept. ZOI0). But for a view suggesting the 
opposite, see P. Sands et al., BOWTT's LAw OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2OO1), at 5Z3-5Z4.  
157 See generally Boon, supra note 3; Alvarez, Misadventures, id. 
158 It is interesting to note that the comments made by states and international organizations in reaction to the ARIO 
have largely focused on those provisions that do not or only partly resemble the ARSIWA, such as the definitions of 
the terms "rules of the organization" and "agent" respectively, and the rules on the test of effective control, counter-
measures, and lex specialis. See Aspremont & Ahlborn, supra note 6. 
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5.2.3 UNHCR’s Implementing Partners 
In fulfilling its protection mandate in general, and administering refugee camps in particular, 
UNHCR relies to a large extent on “partnership” with a wide spectrum of actors. These actors 
include governments and its agencies, United Nations sister agencies, international organizations 
and non-governmental organization. Implementing partners in Ethiopia includes Government 
agencies such as, Administration for Refugee Returnee Affairs, Bureau of Agriculture, Natural 
Resources Development and Environmental Protection. UNHCR implementing partner NGOs in 
Ethiopia are; Action Contre la Faim – France, African Humanitarian Action, African 
Humanitarian Aid and Development Agency, Danish Refugee Council, Development Inter-
Church Aid Department. Orthodox Church Ethiopia, GOAL, HelpAge International, 
International Medical Corps - USA, International Rescue Committee – USA, Jesuit Refugee 
Service, Lutheran World Federation – Switzerland, Mother and Child Development Organization 
– Ethiopia, Mothers and Children Multisectoral Development Organization, Norwegian Refugee 
Council, Opportunities in Industrialization Centre – Ethiopia, Organization for Sustainable 
Development, Oxfam – GB, Partner for Refugee Services, Partnership for Pastoralist 
Development Association, Pastoralist Welfare Organization, Rehabilitation Development 
Organization – Ethiopia, Save the Children International, Save the Environment, Tselemet 
Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office, World Vision International, Zoa 
Vluchtelingenzorg/Refugee Care – Netherlands, IOM, UNOPS, UNV  
 
In order to ascertain UNHCR’s responsibility for the conduct of its implementing partners, it is 
important to understand the process of delegation and contractual relationship between UNHCR 
and the NGO. Article 10 and 12 of the UNHCR Statute specifically establish the basis for these 
implementing partnerships.159 However, this doesn’t clarify the ambiguity regarding UNHCR’s 
mandate to delegate international protection to Implementing Partners.160Although the 
operational conduct of UNHCR indicates that such delegation de facto takes place in the field, 
the ‘standing committee’s’161 background note to the Executive Committee’s fifth session 
                                                          
159 UNHCR, NGO partnership in Refugee Protection, Questions and Answers (2007) 
160 See 160 Maja Janmyr, PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN REFUGEE CAMPS: Unable and Unwilling States, 
UNHCR and International Responsibility, International Refugee Law series, Section 7.4. 
161In October 1995, ExCom established a Standing Committee to replace sub-committees on international protection 
and on administrative and financial matters. The chairing of the Standing Committee is shared by the ExCom 
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particularly stands out as a clear example that UNHCR is not permitted to delegate its function of 
international protection.162  
We will see the circumstances that the conduct of Implementing Partner NGOs conduct 
attributed to UNHCR. The ARIO specify that the conduct of organs or agents in the performance 
of their functions shall be considered an act of the organization. The ILC'S definition of the term 
agent, to mean "an official or other person or entity, other than an organ, who is charged by the 
organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its functions, and thus through 
whom the organization acts," implies that the conduct of UNHCR'S implementing partners shall 
be attributed to the organization.  
The conduct of UNHCR’s NGO implementing partners could potentially engage UNHCR’s 
international responsibility and would therefore be attributable to the organization itself. Under 
the ILC’s ARIO, if it is shown that an international organization is acting through private 
subcontractors has primarily been considered in relation to private security companies (PMC), 
there is an increasing recognition that the ILC rules on attribution also may apply to acts of non-
governmental organizations sub-contracted by an international organization for the delivery of 
particular tasks.163 
5.2.4 Attribution of Conduct to UNHCR 
Articles 6-9 of the ARIO contain rules on attribution of conduct.164 The general rule, found in 
Article 6, addresses the conduct of organs and agents of the organization, while Article 7 deals 
with the attribution of the conduct of a state organ placed at the disposal of an international 
organization, Article 8 the attribution of ultra vires conduct, and Article 9 the attribution of 
conduct subsequently adopted by an international organization. While institutional and judicial 
practices seem far from consolidated in the area of attribution,165 there seems to be a general 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
chairperson and the vice-chairperson. The Standing Committee is scheduled to meet three times a year. At its 
periodic meetings, it examines thematic issues included by the plenary in its programme of work; reviews UNHCR's 
activities and programmes in the different regions (as well as its global programmes); adopts decisions and 
conclusions, as it deems appropriate, on issues included by the plenary in its programme of work; and discusses 
other issues that it deems of concern.  
162 Ibid 
163 See most notably Verdirame, supra note 157, at 101. 
164 See ARIO, supra note 30. 
165 See G. Verdirame, The UN AND HUMAN RIGHTS, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIAN? (2011), at 99. 
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agreement among states and commentators alike that third parties dealing with international 
organizations ought to be protected from harm in their relationship with international 
organizations. In the Cumaraswamy advisory opinion the ICJ notably stated that the UN "may be 
required to bear responsibility for the damage incurred as a result of acts performed by the 
United Nations or by its agents acting in their official capacity.”166 Thus, the basic principle is 
the attribution to the organization of acts of its organs and agents.  
Under the ARIO, UNHCR would be responsible for internationally wrongful acts when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the organization and which constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation. This would mean that, because UNHCR'S international law 
obligations seem to require the organization to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character 
of refugee camps and to provide physical safety to the camp population, a failure on the part of 
UNHCR to do so could under certain circumstances amount to an internationally wrongful act.  
In the above examples the extent in which UNHCR will be held responsible varies. In Pugnido 
case, what I would argue is that, given UNHCR’s supervision role in the camp, it has a 
responsibility to protect refugees. Although it is hard to blame UNHCR in Kalma case, we 
couldn’t spare our criticism of the un-effective intervention by UN and its security council. The 
same goes to Gatumba massacre, UNHCR’s supervisory role would put it in the list of 
responsible bodies, and it’s the offices primary obligation to guarantee the safety of refugees.  
When UNHCR administers refugee camps where the overall conditions amount to a violation of 
the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment, this administration amounts to ultra vires 
conduct for which the organization could be held internationally responsible. In the above 
examples, two separate internationally wrongful acts arise - UNHCR would breach both a rule of 
the organization that possesses an international law character, as well as the international law 
rule prohibiting torture and ill-treatment. However, while UNHCR in many respects may be 
likened to a state when performing its functions in refugee camps, it is important to remember 
that it does not have the institutions normally within the auspices of a state to afford the 
population effective human rights protection. In order to fulfill its human rights obligations, it is 
                                                          
166 Difference relating to immunity from legal process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 
ICJ REPORTS (1999), at 62, 88-89, para.66. 
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nevertheless arguable that UNHCR must enforce the existing human rights framework to the 
fullest of its capabilities.  
If however, the persons or entities through whom the organization acts are organs of a state and 
are placed at the disposal of the international organization, then Article 7 applies. This would be 
Ethiopia case, where government agencies act as UNHCR implementing partners. In this regard, 
the ARIO adopts the test of effective control to determine attribution of conduct.167 
Article 8 of the ARIO, analogous to Article 7 of the ARISWA, provides that the ultra vires 
conduct of an organ or agent is attributable to the organization, provided that the organ or agent 
acted “in the capacity.” A failure to respect an organization’s limitations on competence could 
lead to an organization’s conduct being ultra vires. Verdirame has noted how ultra vires conduct 
can result in two separate wrongful acts whenever it breaches both a rule of the organization that 
possesses an international law character and another rule of international law.168 While human 
rights violations will often include a breach of both these types of rules, Verdirame is of the 
opinion that UNHCR’s encampment policy in itself constitutes a violation of both the rules of 
the organization and of UNHCR’s human rights obligations, primarily since it arbitrarily 
deprives individuals of their freedom of movement, as we have witnessed in Ethiopia. In the 
view of Verdirame, because it is “inherently incompatible with international human right law,” 
the de facto administration of refugee camps normally represents an international 
illegality.169Further support for this argument may be found in the practice of ECtHR, where the 
court found the overall conditions in the Kenyan Dadaab camps, which are quite similar with 
Ethiopian camps, to amount to a violation of the prohibition against torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment as embedded in Article 3 of the ECHR.170 
5.2.5 Shared/Joint Responsibilities 
There is an opportunity under current international law to attribute responsibility to multiple 
actors. While the notion of shared responsibility under international law would have met tough 
                                                          
167 See ILC, second report on responsibility of International Organizations (prepared by G. Gaja, Special 
Rapportteur), 56 session, UN Doc. no.A/CN.4/541(2004) para 40. 
168 Verdirame, supra note 157, at 125 
169 Ibid at 232. 
170 Sufi & Elmi v. UK, 8319/07 [2011] EctHR 1045 (28 June 2011), specifically paras, 278 – 292.  
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criticism in previous decades, developments in human rights law have made the idea of 
attributing responsibility among several entities appear less of a novelty. It is thus suggested that, 
while the host state generally retains responsibility for human rights violations taking place in the 
refugee camp context, other entities, notably UNHCR, and perhaps also the UN by virtue of its 
parenthood over UNHCR, may hold varying degrees of responsibility. When ascertaining the 
degree of responsibility to be attributed to each actor it is suggested that we employ a multi-
layered and hierarchical ladder of responsibility, where the weight is portioned according to 
which actor( s) have effective control. Importantly, however, UNHCR'S international 
responsibility will depend upon the ability and willingness of the host state to provide effective 
protection. In cases where the host state is (willing but) unable, for example owing to limited 
resources or weak institutions, to provide effective protection to refugees in camps, UNHCR 
should have shared responsibility, or perhaps even the entire responsibility for the situation in 
these camps.  
The fact that UNHCR retains responsibility when protection tasks are implemented by its 
partners doesn’t imply that these NGOs are absolved from any eventual responsibility of their 
own. The emerging discussions of the role and responsibilities of NGOs in the international legal 
arena may in time bring about a development which would incur shared responsibility for 
international ally wrongful acts committed in refugee camp settings for a number of different 
actors, the final report of the International Law Association’s (ILA) conference on accountability 
of international organizations, for instance, explicitly recognized that “[i]ssues of shared or joint 
accountability arise when NGO-s are acting as implementing partners for agencies of IO-s in 
areas of development or humanitarian assistance.”171 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
171 It is noteworthy that ”accountability” not necessarily translate into ”responsibility.” see ILA, Accountability of 
International Organizations. Final Report (Berlin Conference, 2004), at 17. 
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Chapter six 
Conclusion 
Throughout the foregoing five chapters, I have examined the allocation of international 
responsibility for human rights violations in refugee camps. I have also dealt with, how refugee 
camp protection is permeated by a large degree of de jure and de facto delegation of power and 
authority over these spaces, primarily between the host state and UNHCR, and between UNHCR 
and its implementing partners. We also pointed out that, no distinct actor(s) fully take on 
responsibility for the human rights situation. And by the same token I highlighted how a number 
of actors can be simultaneously responsible under both the ILC'S Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) and its emerging Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO).  
This paper has questioned the fundamental question of when precisely a host state can accurately 
be considered to be unwilling/unable state. As a state's willingness and ability to provide 
effective protection may not be easily observable, the host state's willingness and ability should 
be determined as an integral part of the determination of UNHCR'S international responsibility.  
More concretely, there are perhaps two ways of dealing with the current problem in which an 
abundance of actors contribute to the human rights violations in refugee camps. The first 
approach is the easy one - it more or less means accepting the current state of affairs with a few, 
but not fundamental, changes. This approach stresses the primary responsibility of the host state 
and turns away from the eventual responsibility of UNHCR and others. As such it essentially 
promotes a transfer of the protection burden back to the sovereign state, who traditionally has 
been the sole responsible actor and who in many cases has the de facto greatest potential to 
provide protection. This approach is appropriate when the host state is able but unwilling to 
provide effective protection in refugee or IDP camps. In such situations, the host state alone shall 
be held internationally responsible.  
The second option and probably the one that I believe goes along with the case in Ethiopia, puts 
more emphasis on the influence of UNHCR in providing such protection, acknowledging its 
important role in practice and the fact that the power it holds vis-a-vis refugees and others is a 
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phenomenon that most likely is here to stay. This triggers a situation of shared responsibility 
between the host state and UNHCR, rather than a situation in which only one actor is exclusively 
responsible. In cases where the host state is (willing but) unable, for example owing to limited 
resources or weak institutions, to provide effective protection to refugees in camps, when 
UNHCR administers these camps, the Organization should have shared responsibility. In 
extreme cases where a host state is clearly willing but unable, UNHCR might have to bear the 
whole responsibility burden. Indeed, UNHCR is bound to human rights of a customary law 
character stemming from its legal personality and the UN Charter, but as this paper has 
highlighted, the scope of UNHCR's mandate of international protection also includes the 
provision of physical security and the maintenance of the camp's civilian and humanitarian 
character. Without establishing a basic level of security in the camps, it would be impossible for 
UNHCR to fulfill either its broader protection or solution seeking mandates; thus, UNHCR holds 
an affirmative duty to act and intervene to secure the basic human rights of refugees. Finally, in 
the last part of this paper I also suggested that, under the ARIO, UNHCR would be responsible 
for the conduct of its NGO implementing partners, even in those instances when it has attempted 
to free itself of responsibility by including certain clauses in its contracts with these NGOS. Few 
changes has to be made in the relationship between UNHCR and its implementing partners with 
the view that these strengthen the protection of refugees and clarify the issue of international 
responsibility. It’s also good to ask whether or not placing refugees in camps is beneficial to their 
protection. 
UNHCR clearly occupies a challenging place in the internationally as it has both mandate and 
also frequently caught in a vice between the preferences of actors such as donor governments 
and host states. It is to be a norm entrepreneur, supervisor and enforcement agency of refugee 
rights at the same time as it is expected to be a cooperative partner to states and NGOS, and the 
ultimate provider of material assistance, so much is the case in Ethiopia. This multitude of roles 
and its implication for refugee protection is perhaps most clearly evidenced in our Ethiopian case 
study. UNHCR'S protection role has become increasingly pragmatic, focusing more on the 
provision of food and shelter, and refugee security has as such had to give way for other 
competing priorities.  
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UNHCR appears to believe that if it "flaunts" its own responsibility, this risks detracting 
attention from the responsibilities of host states, who, after all, have the primary responsibility to 
protect refugees on their territory. However, because it surfaces at the crossroads between state 
sovereignty and international human rights, refugee security is generally considered to be "high 
politics" and exposes a tension between human rights norms and real politics. Organizations such 
as UNHCR tend to view attention to physical protection issues as a threat to their neutrality, 
impartiality and independence. Thus, for fear of jeopardizing relationships with governments, 
UNHCR appears to emphasize "soft diplomacy" and prioritize less controversial tasks, such as 
the provision of material assistance, in the face of "hard" human rights concerns. But, as even 
UNHCR itself has noted, it has a duty to fulfill its mandate regardless of "political circumstances 
and imperatives, UNHCR's challenge thus lies in staying true to its main principles, and not 
throwing them overboard as soon as it meets resistance. This logically means that UNHCR also 
cannot expect to please all sides.  
Without downplaying the fact that UNHCR often has to make choices between bad and less bad 
options on the ground, it is arguable that without an increased focus on basic human rights, 
UNHCR runs a real risk of "simply administering human misery. More importantly, ignoring 
refugee security arguably affects the situation as much as confronting it.  
This paper has highlighted the legal system in Ethiopia and how the applicable laws in the land 
favors the protection of refugees. It all starts from the constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia to the specifically enacted refugee proclamation and establishment of 
Government agency who mandated on refugee issues. Although Ethiopia’s Administration for 
Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is the agency responsible for majority of sectors such 
Health and Nutrition, Primary Education, Protection, Logistics and General Camp 
Administration, it’s surprisingly funded hundred percent by UNHCR. As I learned from my stay 
at Pugnido/Gambella refugee camp in Ethiopia, ARRA is fully mandated in providing 
international protection and material assistance to the existing refugees. 
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